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ral Histories represent the recol-
lections and opinions of the person
interviewed, and not the official
position of MORS. Omissions and errors in
fact are corrected when possible, but every
effort is made to present the interviewee’s own
words.
Lieutenant General Glenn A. Kent,
USAF retired, was the Air Force Assistant
Chief of Staff for Studies and Analysis from
1968 to 1972. He received the MORS Wanner
Award in 1980. At the time of this interview,
Lt Gen Kent was a senior research fellow at
RAND. Lt Gen Kent died 25 April 2012.
MORS ORAL HISTORY
Interview with Lieutenant General Glenn
A. Kent
March 22, 2005; April 19, 2005; July 5, 2005
RAND, Arlington, Virginia
Jim Bexfield, FS, and Bob Sheldon, FS, Inter-
viewers
Bob Sheldon: It’s March 22, 2005. We’re
at RAND in Pentagon City to interview
Lt Gen Glenn Kent. Let me start by asking
you to give your parents’ names, and how
they influenced your career.
Glenn Kent:Myparents’ names are Louis
and Virl Kent. I was born in Nebraska, but
my parents moved our family to Colorado
when I was three without asking me. They
went there to what my granddad in his di-
ary called a paradise. I used to think he
was a smart man until I read that diary.
He called Manzanola, Colorado, paradise.
(Laughing) It’s flat. It’s a part of Colorado
that’s flat, hot, dusty, and dry. It has no
redeeming features as far as the climate is
concerned. The only redeeming feature is
that not many people live there, or want to.
Bob Sheldon: What did your dad do for
a living?
Glenn Kent:He was a farmer for a while
and went broke on a farm.
Bob Sheldon: What kind of farm?
Glenn Kent: The farmers there did row
crops. All of it is irrigated out of the Arkan-
sas River. And most of them had a few
cattle—cows you milk, cattle you slaughter.
Typically in the summertime they’d run
them on the prairie where nobody lived,
and then feed them out and sell them to
a feed lot. The summer we left the farm,
a tremendous five sigma hailstorm wiped
out all the crops. My dad left the cattle out
on the prairie a little longer than usual,
and along came a blizzard and he lost
them all. So we moved off the farm that
fall. That’s during the Depression days,
during the Dust Bowl days of the time.
And the southeastern part of Colorado
was in the Dust Bowl. He worked for
Libby Canning Company, and then finally
lucked out and got a job as foreman work-
ing for a guy named Hayden. Hayden
Ranch—a famous ranch in that area—
15,000-acres with quite a few head of cattle.
And he worked for Hayden the rest of his
life essentially.
Bob Sheldon: Did you do some work on
the farm or ranch?
Glenn Kent: I did when we lived on a
farm. Absolutely.
Bob Sheldon:Was that goodOR training?
Glenn Kent: It was good training to
make you ever thankful for small blessings.
(Laughing)
Bob Sheldon: How old were you when
you moved off the farm into town?
Glenn Kent: I was about fourteen.
Jim Bexfield: About high school age?
Glenn Kent: Yes.
Bob Sheldon: Where did you go to high
school?
Glenn Kent: In a little town by the name
of Manzanola. It’s listed on some maps of
Colorado, but not most. It’s 20 miles west
of La Junta, and 46 miles east of Pueblo, so
it’s between Pueblo and La Junta, which
are shown on all the maps in Colorado.
It’s on Route 50. And the population of that
area lives along the river and the railroad.
The railroad parallels the river, and they
have a junction every nine miles. According
to folklore, that spacing is dictated by God;
it means that a farmer doesn’t have to run
a wagon more than four or five miles to
get to the depot.
Bob Sheldon:Did you excel inmath early
in high school?
Glenn Kent: Early on, I knew math. I
knew more math than the math teacher.
Jim Bexfield: How big was your high
school?
Glenn Kent: It was really large. There
were 14 in my graduating class. That was
a small class, but typically 20 people to
a class.
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Glenn Kent: Yes, I did. I tried to. I didn’t do
very well. I had the unfortunate happenstance
of having skipped the second grade. So people
in my class were older than I was, typically by
a couple of years.
Jim Bexfield: Did you skip second grade be-
cause you were doing so well in first grade?
Glenn Kent: I skipped from first to third. The
first grade teacher thought she was doing me
a favor.
Jim Bexfield: To give you more of a chal-
lenge?
Glenn Kent: Yes. But Manzanola was an
oasis—it’s gone downhill now. It’s not the town
it used to be. All of 300 people live there. Some
people lived in town and ran the farms from
there, a couple of miles out. But Manzanola
was the scourge of the Arkansas Valley. They
were basketball and football champs year after
year there. They beat up on other little towns
along the route there. Not La Junta.
Bob Sheldon: Were you part of the basketball
or football teams?
Glenn Kent:No. I went out for both of them,
but I didn’t especially excel.
Jim Bexfield: So what was your favorite
activity in high school?
Glenn Kent: I went out for those, and that
took up my time. I don’t know that that took
up enough of my time. The only thing I ex-
celled in was track. I ran the mile, and I did
fairly well in that.
Bob Sheldon: Do you recall how fast you
used to run the mile?
Glenn Kent: No. Later on I knew the time,
but I don’t know it in high school. It was just
enough to beat people. (Laughing)
Bob Sheldon: Where did you go to college?
Glenn Kent: I went to Western State College.
I didn’t go to college the first semester I was
out of high school. In Colorado they have a
law—I guess it’s still in effect—that the vale-
dictorian of each class, no matter how large or
small it is, gets a certificate. This certificate is
good for tuition at any state school for four
years. And I was valedictorian at Manzanola.
Beat out all of 14 people. So they give this cer-
tificate for every class and every 20—if you
have 25—every 25 graduates you have, why
they give another certificate. But I still didn’t
go to college first while I was out. I had a job
driving for a man by the name of ‘‘Old Man
Beaty.’’
The average income of Manzanola was
probably higher than any city in the United
States of America. The trouble was the wealth
was all in one family. Anybody that had any
money in Manzanola worked for Mr. Beaty. He
had—count them—60 farms. He owned the
bank. He owned the grain elevator. He owned
a string of grain elevators and a string of alfalfa
mills. He ran cattle down on the river bottom.
He ran sheep on the prairie out south. He had
a manager for each one of these enterprises
and they were the people that had the better
houses.
So I drove a car for Mr. Beaty. He always
had a new Buick. And he was never satisfied.
I’d drive on rough roads out on the prairie
and think that Buick was going to come apart,
and he’d sit over there in the right-hand seat and
said, ‘‘What are we going like a tortoise for? I
gotta go. Go, go, go. Get up. Go.’’ (Laughing)
One turning point was when he went on
a trip to Europe. He didn’t want to go. A trip
to London. The trip to London meant two or
three days on a train to New York, several days
on a ship, and then repeat it coming back. So
he’s gone six weeks maybe. I’m waiting for
him, and he comes back, and I start driving
him someplace to visit those farms. He’s always
making big deals and I’d drive him to Pueblo
or wherever.
And he turned onme and said, ‘‘Why aren’t
you in college?’’ And I said, ‘‘I don’t have the
money, Mr. Beaty.’’ And he said, ‘‘You think
I ever got where I am by saying I couldn’t do
it?’’ I had sense enough not to say I didn’t have
a rich grandfather like you did. (Laughing) But
I didn’t. And he said, ‘‘Look, you think you’re
going to stay in this town and make a living
off of me.’’ And he was about right. He had a
guy that ran the bank. A guy that ran the sheep.
A guy that ran the alfalfa mill. A guy that ran the
cattle. A guy that ran the farms. And he said,
‘‘You’re too good for this town, so come the first
of January, you’re fired. I’m not going to be the
reason you stick around this town.’’
Then he said, ‘‘You go to college and write
me a letter. I’ll send you money.’’ So I went out
to my dad’s on Christmas weekend with an-
other guy named Glenn who went to Western
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State. On the way home, he said, ‘‘Why don’t
you go back to school with me?’’ So I said,
‘‘Okay, I will.’’ And because it flashed through
my mind that Mr. Beaty said I was fired on
1 January, and that was the day after tomorrow
(Laughing), so I decided not to try my career
working for Mr. Beaty. Mr. Beaty was easily
the richest man in all of southeastern Colorado
by a country mile.
Bob Sheldon: What did you choose for your
major in college?
Glenn Kent: Math and physics.
Bob Sheldon: How did you find your mathe-
matics and physics studies in college?
Glenn Kent: I took every math course I
could because I could get an A in them without
studying. It’s a teacher’s college. They teach you
how to teach math. So the algebra is about
the level of algebra they now teach in the third
year of high school, at the senior level. And I’ll
settle for last in history and economics; those
are broadening courses. But I didn’t study very
hard. I had a good math teacher there by the
name of Lucy Spicer, Dr. Spicer. And after her
I had a guy by the name of Dr. Reinhardt
Schuhmann.
Dr. Schuhmann was—as I look back now,
he was an absolute genius. I didn’t know it at
the time. Or didn’t appreciate it if I did know
it. He was a Jewish gentleman. His parents were
German immigrants. In retrospect, he should
have been teaching at Princeton or Yale. But it
was hard for him to get a job. He had a German
accent that wouldn’t quit. Terrible. He was a
brusque individual that suffered no one. And
he just couldn’t get a job befitting his stature.
He finally took this job teaching physics and
math at Western State.
I avoided taking classes under him because
it was well known that he was a tough teacher.
But all that came to a screeching halt one day
when I was summoned to appear in his office.
I went in there and I didn’t knowwhat the meet-
ing was about. There were about 10 other guys
in the room. I look around and they’re all from
the ‘‘egghead’’ fraternity, and I’m out of my
class. I belonged to the fraternity that plays bas-
ketball. (Laughing)
Dr. Schuhmann says, ‘‘I have an agreement
from the President to teach a special course in
theoretical physics. It will convene three days
a week. If you stay in the course, you get an A.
If you don’t stay in the course, you go back
and take regular courses. It wouldn’t be fair
to grade this special course on a curve. So you
get anA if you stay in the course.MeetsMonday,
Wednesday and Friday mornings, 8:00.’’
He then said, ‘‘Howmany of you are taking
advantage of this opportunity?’’ All the mem-
bers of the ‘‘egghead’’ fraternity said ‘‘Gee,
count me in Dr. Schuhmann.’’
I sat there and didn’t raise my hand. Be-
cause I could see a lot of wasted time. (Laughing)
He noticed that, of course. He looked at me
and he poked his head right up against mine
and he said (with a thick German accent), ‘‘Vell
Mr. Kent, vat is the matter vit you?’’ I said, ‘‘I’m
thinking.’’ That made him mad. He said, ‘‘Vell,
vit you, I make the exception. If you do not take
my course, I will see to it you never get an ‘A’
in the math department again.’’ And I think,
‘‘He can’t do that,’’ but then on the other hand
maybe he can. I better not take the chance. So
I said, ‘‘I’d be delighted, Dr. Schuhmann.’’
And then it became a love/hate relationship
that lasted two years. I spent a good deal of time
studying for his course—theoretical physics.
Bob Sheldon: You just took one course from
him in theoretical physics?
Glenn Kent: For two years.
Jim Bexfield: For two years. It was a long
course.
Glenn Kent: Yes, it was one course. It was
really just one subject, but fall, winter, spring
semesters for two years. So I saw a lot of
Dr. Schuhmann.
Jim Bexfield: So what did you do with your
spare time in college?
Glenn Kent: I went out for basketball. That
was a bone of contention with Dr. Schuhmann.
He said, ‘‘I do not understand you. You waste
your time playing this basketball.’’ But the rea-
son I went out for basketball was that if you
made the traveling squad, you got room and
board. You stayed at the athletic dorm and ate
at the athletic table at the school cafeteria. I just
barely hung on being on the traveling squad,
meaning the first I think eight or nine players.
Dr. Schuhmann thought that was an absolute
waste of time.
He was on my back for two years about
studying harder. At the end of two years,
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I was to graduate. I was to graduate at the end
of the summer term because I had not gone in
the first fall semester so I had to go to an extra
summer term to graduate in four years.
So he calls me in, two weeks before grad-
uation and sets me down, said, ‘‘I have now
known you as a student for two years, but I do
not understand you. You do not study. You do
not dedicate yourself. You skip over your home-
work. You play this basketball. You run with
bad people, but still you get the highest grades
of the class.’’ Hewasmaking the point that I just
had not dedicated myself. He said, ‘‘I vant to
know young man, ven are you going to wake
up and decide to make something of yourself?’’
And I did theworst thing I could, somewhat un-
wittingly, I said, ‘‘Well Dr. Schuhmann, I just ac-
cepted a job coaching basketball at Hotchkiss,
Colorado.’’ And the old man just slumped. He
put all of this work into me to go coach basket-
ball, oh no. But this story has a sequel to it.
That course was a savior later on, after I got
into the Air Force. They sent me to Cal Tech
[California Institute of Technology] to studyme-
teorology and aeronautical engineering, all at
the same time. I lucked out—there were 20 of
us in that class, and Cal Tech only gave a mas-
ter’s degree to three. And I was one of them.
So I wrote Dr. Schuhmann a nice letter that said,
‘‘Without having taken your course and your
prodding me, I would never have made it.’’
That’s quite a step to go from a teacher’s college
to studying aeronautical engineering as a grad-
uate student at Cal Tech. That’s a fair step.
Later the war came as a result of Pearl Har-
bor, and I’m in uniform and transferred from the
West Coast to the East Coast. I stopped byWest-
ern State atGunnison, Colorado,made a beeline,
interestingly enough, for Dr. Schuhmann’s of-
fice. He’s glad to see me. He said, ‘‘Vel, we still
have the same course.’’ I thanked him again
for all that he hadmademe do in studyingmath
and theoretical physics. He said, ‘‘We still have
the same course, but it meets at a more decent
hour now, at 2:30 in the afternoon and, of course,
class is about to begin. Would you come in
please?’’ So I did.
He introduced me as one of his previous
students whowent to Cal Tech and got amaster’s
degree. He said, ‘‘Vun of the most dedicated stu-
dents I ever had.’’
Bob Sheldon:When did you first learn to use
a slide rule?
Glenn Kent: In college atWestern State. I first
bought a slide rule in 1932, the top of the line,
Keufell & Esser something or other, had a log-
log scale on it and an exponential scale.
Bob Sheldon:Do you still have your old slide
rule?
Glenn Kent: Yes, I do. But the spring in the
cursor’s broken.
Jim Bexfield: I noticed behind youwhat looks
like a slide rule case. Is that your personal slide
rule?
Glenn Kent: Yes.
Jim Bexfield: Is that your one from college?
Glenn Kent: Yes, sure is.
Jim Bexfield: Wow! You’ve got a much nicer
case than I have. That’s your first and only slide
rule?
Glenn Kent:No, I had some others but this is
the best slide rule I ever had.
Bob Sheldon: Any other math courses in col-
lege that impressed you?
Glenn Kent: Not really. I just took the gen-
eral rig-a-ma-role of Algebra, Algebra II, Trig-
onometry, and Solid Geometry. That’s about it.
Jim Bexfield: So you graduated from college
and then you did what?
Glenn Kent: I got a job coaching basketball
in a town by the name of Hotchkiss, Colorado.
It’s quite close to the mountains, but it’s on the
western slope of the Great Divide. I coached
basketball there for three years.
Bob Sheldon: How well did your team do?
Glenn Kent: The team did fairly well.
Jim Bexfield: Were you teaching math?
Glenn Kent: Oh, yes. The normal thing in
those high schools is that a coach also teaches
math and physics. As a matter of fact, you’re
really hired as a teacher for math and phys-
ics, and you get a little extra for coaching
basketball.
Jim Bexfield: What got you out of that?
Glenn Kent: The draft. Before Pearl Harbor,
they had a draft and that’s the only lottery I ever
won inmy life. I was in the first wave of draftees
inducted. So I joined the Army Air Corps to
avoid being drafted into the Army. I passed
their physicals, and in those days their physicals
were really tough because they had far more
candidates than they could accept. That was
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before Pearl Harbor, you see. I was only one of
eight that passed the physical that day at Lowry
Air Force Base. But I didn’t quite pass. They
noticed this swelling on my right ankle, which
I had sprained two or three weeks before. It
would have gotten well in no time, but they
had to take an x-ray. They found that I’d broken
it in college playing basketball, and it hadn’t
set right. So they had to get a waiver, and the
waiver never came. Finally they said, ‘‘We have
a new proposition for you. We’re going to send
a group of people to Cal Tech to studymeteorol-
ogy and aeronautical engineering, do you want
to join?’’ So I did.
Bob Sheldon: You joined the Army Air Corps
in 1941. Howmanymonths before Pearl Harbor?
Glenn Kent: I joined it in July of 1941 and
went to Cal Tech. And then Pearl Harbor hap-
pened while I was at Cal Tech.
Bob Sheldon:Did you take a standard curric-
ulum at Cal Tech?
Glenn Kent: No, they made a special course
for this group.
Jim Bexfield: And it lasted how long?
Glenn Kent: From spring of 1941 until spring
of 1942. About a year.
Bob Sheldon: What kinds of courses did you
take?
Glenn Kent:We took courses in meteorology
and forecasting. The toughest courses in aero-
nautical engineering were taught by Dr. Homer
Joe Stewart, a renowned aeronautical engineer
at Cal Tech. He had derived formulas for every-
thing. And mainly our job was to repeat these
derivations. The math was so complicated that
I finally gave up doing it—I could do the math,
but it took me too long. I couldn’t do it in the
time allotted during the test period. I found
out from another graduate student there that
Homer Joe always usedhis derivations as a basis
for his quizzes—in fact, his quizzes were de-
rived from these derivations and there were
about 30 of them. So I memorized these deriva-
tions by rote, absolutely memorized them step
by step. I had them on 3-by-5 cards, and when
Iwas out jogging I’dwork onmemorizing them.
So I got an A in every quiz and didn’t un-
derstand the subject. I not only got an A, I got
100% on every quiz. Simply because I memo-
rized 24 derivations and I was always lucky that
the quiz was never out of the book. Meaning
there wasn’t a derivation that I hadn’t memo-
rized. So there’s a certain amount of luck there.
Bob Sheldon: Did you have to take statistics?
Glenn Kent: No. Homer Joe Stewart was
great on things like—if you see a flag out there
on a flagpole waving, if you know the speed
of the wind, the length of the flag, the density
of the cloth, and a few other things, you can tell
what is the amplitude of the waves on the flag
and their repetition rate. I don’t see a flag any
more without thinking of that formula. (Laugh-
ing) We learned a lot of useful things like that.
Bob Sheldon: Where did you go from Cal
Tech?
Glenn Kent: The orders just said report to
March Field. I did. I’m the Second Lieutenant,
brand new. Okay? Go out to March Field and
report in, and they say ‘‘Yes, you’re going to
be the Vice Commander of the boot camp.’’
I said, ‘‘They sent me in to be the Vice Com-
mander of a boot camp—there must be a mis-
take.’’ I got no sympathy from that lieutenant
colonel, who hated second lieutenants. He said,
‘‘Orders are orders. Quit complaining.’’
So I became the Vice Commander of a boot
camp to teach close-order drills not knowing
anything about them. (Laughing) Not much
about it. But I survived. The guys that really
ran the boot camp were sergeants from the
Presidio, and they weren’t a happy lot. They
weren’t a happy lot anyhow, and these were par-
ticularly unhappy to be transferred from that
garden spot of Presidio up near San Francisco
down to March Field. The boot camp was in
what I’d call a swamp. They weren’t happy,
and they don’t like second lieutenants. I was
there for maybe six months.
Jim Bexfield: And then what happened?
Glenn Kent: They realized I wasn’t the
home and garden variety second lieutenant.
And I gradually won the confidence of the head
guy there. The head NCOIC (noncommissioned
officer in charge). And they gave me a party
when I left. I’ll always remember that. They
said, ‘‘Lieutenant, we don’t know what makes
you tick. We like you, though. But let’s tell you
this—you’re never going very far in this Air
Force. You’re too damned easy.’’ (Laughing) Too
easy. I had no choice.
Jim Bexfield:Youwere too easy on the people
in the boot camp?
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Glenn Kent: What I did was I preached to
them over and over that we’re not here to make
these poor GIs unhappy. They’re unhappy
enough as it is. We’re here to help them. We’re
not here to find out why they can’t go on week-
end leave. We’re here to help and teach. They
thought that was a rather unique attitude. I
kept hammering that home. That we’re not here
to entrap them into mistakes. So the weekend
leave went up dramatically. Or to say it in a
negative way, the number of people restricted
from weekend leave went down dramatically.
We had a pass in review every Saturday morn-
ing between a lieutenant colonel who hated ev-
erybody, so I worked up this proposition to
him. That during the week we’ll observe how
hard people try, and put all the people who
didn’t try very hard in the rear rank. If we find
anybody out of step in the rear rank, you can
put them down. But not the whole company.
They said, ‘‘He’ll eat you up.’’ So I went up there
and he did. (Laughing)He said, ‘‘I make the pol-
icy around here. You’re a damned second lieu-
tenant.’’ So I came back and reported that to
the Sergeant and I said, ‘‘I don’t think I pre-
sented my case quite as well as I could. I’ll try
again.’’ The Sergeant rolled his eyes. But I went
up there again and he about threw me out. It
was a trivial matter as I look back now. Not so
trivial then. He said, ‘‘All right.’’
Bob Sheldon: Did your having coached bas-
ketball and taught high school affect your style
at that boot camp?
Glenn Kent: It might have helped me some.
But I think what helped me more was to under-
stand that I’m not there to make those guys
moremiserable than they are. They’remiserable
enough. So I went up and said you know they
built the boot camp on March Field down in
the marshy areas, and had a lot of rain that year.
The place was turned practically into a swamp.
We need to move the camp to drier ground. He
would hear nothing of it. And I persisted on
that. The second time I went to him on that,
why he said, ‘‘All right.’’ I told him, ‘‘Look, we
won’t stand down the training. We’ll move over
the weekend.’’ So we moved over the weekend
to a better place. And everybody was thankful
for that. The Sergeant began to be impressed.
They hated this lieutenant colonel. They knew
him up at Presidio. He was a senior NCO up
there, and they promoted him directly to lieu-
tenant colonel. They hated him anyhow, and
they hated him because he got promoted. They
were pretty impressed that I had persevered
twice in a row with this guy. So things picked
up at the boot camp because at least we were
on dry ground.
Jim Bexfield: So what happened next, when
you got reassigned?
Glenn Kent: Then they called out to March
Field and said, ‘‘You were right.’’ (Laughing)
And they sent me to study under a guy by the
name of Joe George, Chief ofMeteorology down
at EasternAirlines, Atlanta, Georgia. I was down
there for about nine months.
Bob Sheldon:What did you study from him?
Glenn Kent: How to forecast weather. How
to draw weather maps. He was the chief meteo-
rologist for Eastern Airlines, which was a big
outfit at the time.
Bob Sheldon: Was what you learned from
him different from what you learned in the
Cal Tech weather school?
Glenn Kent: Yes, it was more practical, be-
cause I worked in his office and we had to make
forecasts that meant something for Eastern Air-
lines. It was putting into practice what I’d been
taught theoretically at Cal Tech.
Bob Sheldon: Where did you go from there?
Glenn Kent: I went to Goose Bay, Labrador.
I think I made First Lieutenant soon after I ar-
rived at Goose Bay and Captain soon after.
Not very far apart. Goose Bay was part of the
North Atlantic ferry route. Where they ferried
aircraft to Europe—the staging base was
Presque Isle, Maine, and they ferried them first
to Goose Bay, Labrador. From there to BW-1
Greenland, which is on the southern tip of
Greenland. From there to Keflavik, Iceland.
And from there to Stornoway in the United
Kingdom. If you follow me.
Somebody else was the station weather offi-
cer. I was about third in rank. Things came to
a change, though, one day. They had Visiting
Officer’s Quarters (VOQs) that were built along
the flight line where transient crews stayed.
They’re like an austere hotel. And they had
a dining room there. You could eat there and
the food was a little better than the ordinary
mess. And the room was crowded. In walks
a colonel—big, strapping guy, looked like he
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owned the world. There weren’t too many colo-
nels around in those days, at least not up there.
He looks around, and I’m sitting there by my-
self, and the only vacant seat in the house is op-
posite me. So he walks up and says, ‘‘Captain,
may I join you?’’ Well, of course.
We started conversing, and all of a sudden
I detected it took a different turn. Then he looks
at me and he said, ‘‘Look, I’m up here under
direct charter of Gen Arnold to straighten out
this ferry route. Because the planes weren’t
coming through as fast as they should, and
Eisenhower is complaining to Arnold. And I’m
up here to straighten it out.’’ His namewas Ford.
Col Ford. ‘‘Wild Bill’’ Ford.
He said, ‘‘I’m putting together a crew to go
out—I’m going up to BW-1 and establish a con-
trol center there. I’m going to put together a
crew in your honor.’’ I look at him, and he said,
‘‘Look, I can get anybody I want, so don’t tell
me that you work under orders from somebody
else.’’ Finally, I realized that the guy meant busi-
ness. I said, ‘‘Yes, sir. When dowe leave?’’ ‘‘Right
away. Pack your bags and be down there at the
hangar.’’
‘‘Yes, sir.’’ So I did. I get to the hangar and
he marches up to me and pins Major leaves on
me. He said, ‘‘I’m promoting you to Major.’’ I at
least had sense enough to say, ‘‘You can’t do that,
I’ve only been a Captain six weeks.’’ (Laughing)
But he did. And he had the authority to do it.
I paid for that by working for Wild Bill Ford
for the next two years. Twenty-four hours a day,
seven days a week, 365 days a year. And he
meant it.
Jim Bexfield: And this was at —
Glenn Kent: BW-1. It’s a code word. Bluie
West One was the code word for Narsarsuaq
Air Base.
Jim Bexfield: What was it close to?
Glenn Kent: I’ll tell you exactly where it is.
It’s 35 miles up tundra arctic fiords on the very
southwestern tip of Greenland.
Jim Bexfield: It was pretty cold?
Glenn Kent: Nope. It wasn’t cold. Labra-
dor was cold. Labrador is ungodly cold. But
Greenland—on the western slope you don’t
get the badweather they get on the eastern slope.
Those Aleutian lows form up there, and oc-
cluded fronts go around them, and they dump
an ungodly amount of snow on the eastern coast
of Greenland. That’s what makes it an icecap.
But if you go down to the southern tip, on the
western side, where the air has to come over
the ice cap to get to you, it’s warmer.
Bob Sheldon: What did you do to improve
the flow of aircraft?
Glenn Kent: Every morning I reported down
at the weather station at 2:00 a.m. I had to write
out the movements of the day, which is a big
job. You’re constrained by tie-down slots. The
winds come up and they lost aircraft, so there
was a rule that you don’t park an airplane un-
less there’s a tie-down slot for it. That holds
at Greenland and Iceland both. Those airports
were very constrained. So you had to figure
out what slots were going to open up in Iceland,
and ship an aircraft from Greenland up there,
and because that opens up slots in Greenland,
you ship one fromPresque Isle up to Greenland.
You had to make out the movements of the day,
and you had to be careful that after the move-
ments of the day were executed, there are no
aircraft at either Greenland or Iceland for which
there wasn’t a tie-down slot.
You had different types of aircraft, and you
may, on marginal days, send the B17, which we
had a few of going through there. They were
mostly B25s—you might send them but not send
the B26s. That’s because the B26s, the Martin
Marauder, had an operating altitude of exactly
13,000 feet. There were always clouds across
the straits fromGreenland to Iceland. It’s a ques-
tion of how high they are.
Bob Sheldon: How much did the flow of air-
craft increase after your work?
Glenn Kent: Ford got great credit for it, and
justly so. He improved the situation dramati-
cally. I think there was a book written about
it—I can’t remember the name of it—about how
Bill Ford became a legend up there.
Jim Bexfield:What happened after the war to
Bill Ford? Did he stay in the military?
Glenn Kent: Ford had been a roommate of
Arnold during flying training and he went to
TWA and was a captain. After he finished his
tour in Greenland, which lasted about two years,
until the ferry was over, he left BW-1 and went
back to the states and became a captain at TWA
again. He went up there at the direct request of
Arnold and agreed to do it as long as required.
Wild William knew everything.
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Jim Bexfield: So he probably knew you before
he sat down next to you at the dinner table?
Glenn Kent:No. I don’t think so. I found out
that’s the way he operated—if he liked you.
Bob Sheldon: Did you work on the ferries
coming back?
Glenn Kent: No. Because by the time he left
Greenland, Bill Ford was a brigadier general.
I left two days later. That’s what he always
said, ‘‘You’re going to leave here two days after
I do.’’ (Laughing)
Jim Bexfield: And B17s would go through,
but you would keep them longer because they
couldn’t fly?
Glenn Kent: No. B26s. They just wouldn’t
be sent. So they’d have to stay over until the
weather was good.We had one shot a day. Espe-
cially in the wintertime. It’s hardly a shot. The
sun doesn’t come until late and sets early that
far north.
Jim Bexfield:And the ceiling for the B17s was
what? About 17,000?
Glenn Kent: I think it was higher than that.
But I don’t recall for sure.
We had commercial airlines, too. They called
them contract pilots. They were flying C47s and
C46s up there. Flying cargo. They were contract
pilots from airlines in the states. We could send
them in pretty bad weather. You understand
that some of these pilots going through there
were six weeks out of training. They couldn’t
do instrument letdowns. So it was disaster if
the fog rolled in on Iceland as it did on us a cou-
ple of times.
Bob Sheldon:What was your loss rate due to
airplanes falling out from weather?
Glenn Kent: It went down dramatically. Be-
fore Ford went up there, it was fairly high. But
it went down dramatically. I don’t know the
number, but it went down dramatically with
Ford up there.
The only recreation was at the officers’ club,
shooting dice, playing poker. But I didn’t have
much time for that obviously. I got so I couldn’t
sleep. I was lying there in bed. I’d say, ‘‘Go to
sleep, you have to get up at two.’’ Finally I just
woremyself out. I was inmarvelous shape other-
wise. So I went to the hospital and he gave me
something to induce sleep and putme in the hos-
pital. At 7:00 the next morning the doc comes in,
wakes me up. Said there’s been a new diagnosis.
Gen Ford says you aren’t sick. (Laughing) And
he wants you to report for duty within the hour.
Bob Sheldon: He had a second opinion.
Glenn Kent: Yes.
Jim Bexfield: But you had a good sleep.
What happened when you left there?
Glenn Kent: I went from there to Grenier
Field, and I was at Grenier for I don’t know
how long. I was the weather officer at Grenier
Field in New Hampshire. And along came V.E.
Day and then V.J. Day and I got out of the Army
Air Corps and went back to Colorado and
worked for the Bureau of Reclamation for a
while.
Bob Sheldon: What did you work on for the
Bureau of Reclamation?
Glenn Kent: Predicting floods on the major
river in Wyoming. It’s either the Yellowtail River
or the Yellowstone River. I was working on flood
design for the Bureau of Reclamation. How big
does the dam have to be to hold a 30-year flood?
Jim Bexfield: And that was in what town?
Glenn Kent: Denver.
Then I got a letter that offeredme a commis-
sion in the Air Corps so I took it.
Jim Bexfield: This was in 1946?
Glenn Kent: Yes. Went back there and was
sent to Westover Field. I’d been there a short
time when they announced that there was a
problem with these isolated weather stations
in the far north and they were sending some-
body up there to be sure it wasn’t the Weather
Service’s fault. They sent me back to Goose
Bay, Labrador, and I was not happy. (Laughing)
That was a rather traumatic affair up there,
because the inspector general (IG) was up there
constantly. The United States government had
made an agreementwith Canada to keep certain
isolated stations open that later became part
of the DEW (Defense Early Warning) line. And
some of the stations were regularly closing
down, so it became a big, number one item for
the IG. The guy that was really fouling it up
was the Commander of Goose Bay, the Colonel.
He was finally relieved of duty.
Bob Sheldon: Were you a Major?
Glenn Kent: I’m still a Major. Yes.
So I left Goose Bay under a cloud. Not by
the IG. The IG didn’t get after me. They got after
the right person. I went from there to Westover
and the IG said, ‘‘I have to get you out of Goose
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Bay.’’ Because by then I was at loggerheads with
the Commander. They found this group of peo-
ple theywere going to send to study radiological
engineering, how to mitigate the effects of
atomic bursts. We went to the Naval Postgrad-
uate School at Annapolis. I was sent belatedly
to that group because a guy that was scheduled
in the group got sick. So that changed my whole
career in a new direction.
Bob Sheldon: How large was your class?
Glenn Kent: Originally there were 27. I re-
member the exact number because they sent
you to the Naval Postgraduate School to prep
you to go to University of California at Berkeley
for the course. And they only sent 13 on. Less
than half. I made the cut and went to Berkeley.
Got a master’s degree in radiological engineer-
ing from Berkeley, a special course. From there
I was assigned to the Pentagon.
Bob Sheldon: Were there a lot of physics
courses in that radiological engineering cur-
riculum?
Glenn Kent: Yes. At the Naval Postgraduate
School it was a lot of physics and a lot of math.
At Berkeley it was more, but not so much math.
Math was the killer at the Postgraduate School.
Bob Sheldon: That’s what weeded out the
other half?
Glenn Kent: Yes, the math killed them.
Bob Sheldon: After you graduated from Ber-
keley, what was your assignment?
Glenn Kent: I was assigned to the Armament
Division in the Pentagon. The Armament Divi-
sion was a division under a two-star general
by the name of Yates [Donald Yates, later a
Lt Gen] who had Research and Development.
Bob Sheldon: What was your role?
Glenn Kent:My first job was a fairly interest-
ing one. I might say ahead of time that of all the
people I worked for, Yates was the smartest and
the meanest. Easily. On both counts.
I was assigned to a very secret project that
nobody knows about today because they didn’t
know about it then. So I’ll call it Project X.
Project X was a very secret idea. It was totally
wrong. The concept was to take the waste from
nuclear reactors, grind it up, make it into pellets
by putting certain binder material in it, put
the pellets in fluted spheres about the size of
a softball, put the spheres in a dispenser, maybe
a 1,000-pound dispenser. You’d dispense this
over some area, the spheres would come apart
at the right time and deposit these little pellets.
They were going to create a barrier on the cen-
tral front in Europe. A barrier in the sense that
if a Russian tank tried to drive across there, the
crew would be sick before they got to the other
side.
I don’t need to say that they didn’t file an
environmental impact (Laughing). One reason
they kept it secret I think is because they didn’t
want to alarm the Germans. It didn’t make
much sense. I had an adverse reaction to it from
the get-go. I’m a major, and the Colonel, that’s
my immediate boss, is from the Chemical Corps,
and this is his pet project. The Chemical Corps
of the Army was involved in it, too.
I decided to make a calculation. It’s an in-
teresting problem, because there comes a day
when you lose as much radiation as you had.
So there’s an equilibrium point, depending on
howmany nuclear reactors you have. Let’s look
at the equilibrium point; the point at which
I know there won’t be any more than that the
next day. Because there, as much decays that
day as you add. And see how long the barrier
might be. There had been some calculations
made, but I reviewed them and they were obvi-
ously naı¨ve and fatally flawed.
So I went to the physics department at
RAND and they helped me. They thought it
was a neat project to work on, and we came
out with a number of 100. Meaning the barrier
you could create would be 100 miles long.
Maybe it was 10 miles wide. The width was de-
termined by how long you had to stay in it to
get a sickening dose of radiation. But it was less
than 100 miles long.
Bob Sheldon: This covered the Fulda Gap?
Glenn Kent: Yes. You got it. It is a miniscule
part of the central front, even though it uses all
the nuclearmaterial they had. The Russians could
easily drive around it. I showed this study to my
immediate boss. It’s not a bound-up study or any-
thing. It’s written out byme. The computers were
unknown in those days. And my boss wasn’t
happy. I don’t know to this day how it happened,
but Yates gotwind of this study andhe invitedme
up there to tell himabout it. So I did. I handedhim
this handwritten thing and he put it in his brief-
case (Laughing). So obviously my immediate boss
wasn’t happy about that either.
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About two weeks later Gen Yates calls me
up there again. He said, ‘‘Let’s review the bid-
ding here. You’re aMajor. You’ve been in on this
project about two months. But you know it all
because you went to school. You did the study.
I was foolish enough to believe you. I showed
it to the other people. They had a steering group
for this project of other generals. They referred
your study to a Dr. Libby at the University of
Chicago, who reports that your study is fatally
flawed. What have you got to say for yourself?
I was foolish enough to believe you, and you left
me hanging out to dry.What have you got to say
for yourself?’’
I said, ‘‘I don’t know that the study is
wrong. Before we decide it’s wrong, I want to
see Dr. Libby’s critique.’’ ‘‘Are you telling me
that you know more than Dr. Libby?’’ Dr. Libby
was a renowned physical chemist [he won the
Nobel Prize in Chemistry for 1960]. I said, ‘‘No.
It’s really not my study, Gen Yates. There were
three very smart people at RAND involved in
this: Dr. Al Latter, Dr. Ernie Plesset, and. Dr. Leon
Goure.’’ Names that are fairly commonly known
now. They weren’t so well known then.
So he said, ‘‘Alright, I’ll get hold of
Dr. Libby’s critique.’’ In two weeks we reported
back up there. Now with the RAND guys in
tow, they say Dr. Libby is way off. ‘‘We stand
by our number. It’s less than 100 miles.’’ So
armed with that, I set about to cancel the proj-
ect. And I did. I finally succeeded. Of course,
now it would die of boredom.
Bob Sheldon: Did you find out what Libby’s
critique was?
Glenn Kent: The fuel there is from the
ground; how much fuel there is from the tank,
how much can the crew absorb without getting
sick? These are not well established numbers.
So there’s plenty of opportunity—the crew is irra-
diated by pellets near the tank. So you had to in-
tegrate outward. It was not an easy calculation.
I learned then it was far easier to damn the cri-
tique than to support your own study. (Laughing)
Jim Bexfield: RANDwas in California at that
time?
Glenn Kent: Yes.
Jim Bexfield: So you were traveling to Cali-
fornia for this?
Glenn Kent: Yes. I had taken a trip there
under other pretenses. I couldn’t say it was for
Project X, because nobody knew about Project
X. Anyhow, I went out there at some risk, read
those guys into it.
Bob Sheldon: What were your other projects
at the Armament Division?
Glenn Kent: At the headquarters of the
United States Air Force. One other important
one was the MB-1 rocket. I might go through
the saga of that. In those days, there were no
ICBMs. None to count. The main threat to the
United States was Soviet bombers. The Soviets
had a bomber that was something like a B29.
We didn’t have Sidewinders or Sparrows (air-
to-air missiles), but rather a free-flight rocket
that had a likelihood of hitting a bomber that
was quite low, if you follow me. It didn’t have
its own guidance.
So I came up with the idea, which wasn’t
one of my better ideas, why not put a nuclear
warhead on the end of this rocket and make up
for the miss distance. (Laughing) Yates thought
that was a splendid idea, and bought it, and
sent me out to Albuquerque to be the program
manager for this rocket that’s got a nuclear
warhead on the front end of it. So I was trans-
ferred to Albuquerque.
Bob Sheldon: You had already spent three
years working for Yates?
Glenn Kent: It was about three. In the mean-
time Imade lieutenant colonel andwas transferred
to Albuquerque. When I got to Albuquerque,
they alsomademe the Vice Chief of the Research
Directorate. Later, an officer by the name of Col
Giller [later Maj Gen Edward Giller became as-
sistant general manager for military applications
at the Atomic Energy Commission] came in to be
the Chief. That was the genesis. The lab out there
is now called the Air ForceWeapons Lab. But the
thing that consumed a good deal of my time at
first out there was the MB-1 rocket. I was a pro-
gram manager. And that’s the lesson that taught
me well: to be aware of the ORD (Operational
Requirements Document) requirements.
My first job was to define in some detail the
characteristics of this rocket. It was to go on the
F89J, so wewere to use an existing rocket motor.
So that told you what thrust you had available,
whatever that rocketmotor gives you.We had to
use the fire control system on the F89J, which
was alleged to be about a 24 mil system—a
one mil area is one foot in a thousand. We were
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to shoot at a maneuvering B29. Now the analy-
sis of that was pretty daunting, because I didn’t
know the lethal volumes. Lethal volume wasn’t
well known in those days, so I went to Wright
Field to get those lethal volumes. They let the
contract. I had Research do it.
The lethal volume is not an even sphere.
There’s a lobe for the gust on the lower side of
the wing, and another on the top of the wing.
Gusts for the horizontal tail, the vertical tail.
Airplanes can take a lot of gusts head-on, but
they can’t take transverse gusts. So it’s a compli-
cated affair.
I was a little leery of what Wright Field pro-
vided me in these volumes so I had the physics
department at RAND, Dr. Leon Goure and
Dr. Ernie Plesset, do an independent study of
these volumes. Not satisfied with that, I went
to Sandia Corporation. I had a good relationship
with the guy that ran it. He put two guys—
Dr. Dyke and Dr. Wood—on the project. It’s
a pretty daunting analysis to figure out what’s
the probability of kill given an engagement. If
you don’t know the lethal volumes, you don’t
know for sure what the error is and all of that.
We had to shoot a maneuvering bomber so
there’s an offset error. The fire control systems
on the F89J just predicted where the aircraft
would be if it pulled no Gs from the last time
you saw it. So if it’s pulling Gs, there’s an offset,
and that goes up as time-squared. So the time of
flight of the rocket was critical.
I had approximated the lethal volumes out
there as an equivalent sphere, which turned
out to be a mistake to do mathematically. Mean-
ing that the volume of the sphere—a perfect
sphere is the sum of the globes out there. Now
I can do it using mathematics: what is the prob-
ability of the shot being within the sphere? But
that approach grossly understates the probabil-
ity of kill. Leon Goure and the guys at RAND
had a computer, which I didn’t. So they did it
stochastically. They Monte Carlo’d where the
actual hits were and saw whether they were in
one of these volumes. They didn’t do it mathe-
matically. They did it stochastically—if I have
the words right.
They also looked at those volumes and de-
cided the right two volumes were off by a factor
of three. But even so, when they do it stochasti-
cally, they get a high probability of kill. So there
are two errors. In my original cut, I did it by ap-
proximating the sphere and using large vol-
umes. Using the larger volumes, I got about
point eight (0.8). But I got smarter and knew
the volumes were wrong, and that you should
do it stochastically, and there were compensat-
ing errors, so you got about the same answer.
Well, the requirements people from the
Pentagon came out there and thought I needed
help. They said they had a document that stated
the requirements for this rocket. It was a 2 kilo-
ton warhead. Time of flight, 3,600 feet per sec-
ond, average velocity for five seconds, and 20
mil error. Well, I go to Los Alamos and ask them
what’s the size of the warhead to get a 2KTyield
and take that and put it on the front of that
rocket I have, and it won’t go 3,600 feet per sec-
ond. It’s not executable. But according to these
other numbers, I get a high probability of kill.
Well, at that time I was using the wrong
analysis. I was using the large volume, and the
mathematical approach to determine probabil-
ity of kill. Shortly after they left, I found out both
of them were wrong, but I still got about the
same answer because I had compensating errors.
They came out there again and said, ‘‘Have
you changed the program?’’ I said, ‘‘No. Be-
cause I get a good probability of kill with 1.8 KT,
3,200 feet per second, and so on. And that’s exe-
cutable. I can do those, but I can’t meet your re-
quirements.’’ They say, ‘‘Don’t complain about
what you can’t do. Just meet them.’’ (Laughing)
Which is just insane garbage.
They pressured me, and I made a tactical
error. They said, ‘‘Are you going to change to
these requirements?’’ I said, ‘‘No.’’ And they
are aghast. This is three colonels. I think I was
Lieutenant Colonel at the time, saying no to
them. I said, ‘‘The onlyway therewill be a change
is if you get a new program manager.’’ They
said, ‘‘We’ll work that problem.’’ (Laughing)
And that was a tactical error I made. They went
back to the Pentagon and the next thing I knew,
the Chief of Staff at the Air Force had commis-
sioned a Scientific Advisory Board of the Air
Force to look at this mess of the MB-1 rocket.
They hired a guy I’ll call Dr. X to critiquemy
study. I called him and said, ‘‘My original study
has been changed—I revised it.’’ He cut me off.
So I made the decision right there on the phone,
let him think I used the original approach. See?
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Because he now thinks that my analysis is fa-
tally flawed because I used a larger volume.
He doesn’t know that if you do it stochastically
you still get about the same answer. And he
thinks it’s something I did alone. I didn’t—he
cut me off, and I didn’t tell him that RAND
and Sandia Corporation had both looked at this
and got about the same results that I came up
with.
So come the day before the SAB, Dr. X gets
up and has a stirring critique of the wrong
study. (Laughing) And he’s spending the morn-
ing doing that and then he said to the SAB elo-
quently, ‘‘Well, what do you expect in a form
of analysis from a colonel that doesn’t un-
derstand ops analysis and supported by five
Lieutenants with handheld calculators?’’ See,
he had a computer. We had calculators.
It came my turn. I had a slide that said
I used smaller volumes in my analysis than
Dr. X did in his, so we can do away with the
argument about volumes to Dr. Allen Puckett.
(Dr. Puckett headed that SAB and was huge
later on, a CEO at Hughes Aircraft Company).
So volume isn’t an issue. Dr. Xmade themistake
of saying it is.
And he said, ‘‘The volumes I got from
Wright Field.’’ But I said, ‘‘I didn’t use them.’’
(Laughing) ‘‘And we now know the error that
you made in your study and that is this approx-
imation of the sphere.’’ So you’d say mathemat-
ical technique.
This rather unnerved him to say the least.
By then it’s clear to the SAB that it wasn’t my
study, it was RAND’s and Sandia Corporation’s
also, and they’re sitting there in the audience
ready to get up and testify, and that the big error
is the approximation of the sphere versus the
stochastic approach.
I had rehearsed this fairly carefully. My
career was on the line because I’m about to be
relieved of that MB-1 project. I said, ‘‘Dr. X, in
your critique you said we used the standoff
distance, which mattered a lot because the off-
set went up as the time of flight squared.’’ So I
said, "You said for an offset, for a safe escape
we should have used the business that the pilot
never got more than 25 rem (Roentgen Equiva-
lent Man—a measure of radiation absorption)
and we used a number that the median dose
would be 30 rem or something like that. I asked
my Lieutenants, ‘‘Which is themore demanding
standoff?’’ And you know what they said to
Dr. X? ‘‘You’re right about how you can’t de-
pend on these Lieutenants. They tried to do
the analysis and said they didn’t know how to
calculate it without using a binomial or nor-
mal distribution. But evidently with your com-
puter you could. So now we’ll all stand aside
for a moment and you can inform this group
how you calculate a binomial distribution.’’
He said, ‘‘But I didn’t use binomial distribu-
tion.’’ I said that my lieutenants indicated they
can calculate three sigma, two sigma, and so
on, but not binomial." He said, ‘‘I didn’t use bi-
nomial. You know what I used. I used three
sigma.’’ ‘‘And called it binomial and you accuse
me of mathematical ineloquence?’’ (Laughing)
‘‘You owe an apology to these five lieutenants.’’
At this point Dr. X said, ‘‘I refuse to stand
here and be harassed by this Colonel.’’ I said,
‘‘Fine. Sit down. I win, you lose. The analysis
is without error. And yours is fatally flawed.
The game is over.’’ At which Dr. Puckett said,
‘‘Not quite so fast.’’ (Laughing) But I got a clean
bill of health. A little luck played out. From then
on I was untouchable, running the MB-1 rocket.
The SAB gave me an absolutely clean bill of
health. Reported back up to the Chief that he’s
doing it exactly right, and to follow those
requirements from the Pentagon would be
a disaster.
The MB-1 project, from an acquisition
standpoint, was a howling success. It came in
on schedule. Shortly after this it was pre-
planned, I was to hand this over to another
guy and spend most of my time running the
Research Directorate. The other guy was Col Bill
Black, but he brought the project in. But it came
in on schedule, ahead of schedule, under cost,
and on performance. How could I miss? Los
Alamos said that we can get 1.9 KT so I put
them down for 1.8. Douglas said they can get
3,400 feet per second out of that rocket for this,
so I put them down for 3,200. As a requirement.
So from that standpoint, it was highly suc-
cessful. But along came Sidewinder already at
two-thirds of the way through, and they owed
me one project. I went up to Naval Weapons
Center out there in the desert in California and
realized the MB-1 rocket was obsolete before it
ever made the IOC.
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So you can now find MB-1 rockets hidden
away in some museum, but that’s about it.
They built quite a few of them. But they never
were used in combat, of course. They became
unusable because of the fallout. They wouldn’t
let you fly over cities with them. Because of the
nuclear warhead they became unusable.
Bob Sheldon: There was no guidance sys-
tem on the MB-1?
Glenn Kent: No. That was the secret of
them. We didn’t know about guidance then.
The Naval Weapons Center hadn’t yet invented
this guidance. They were just inventing it. So in
retrospect, I should have stepped up to the plate
and reported that this thing was obsolete half-
way through the project. But, in my defense,
I didn’t know that Sidewinder was going to
work as dramatically as it did.
Jim Bexfield: You were there for how many
years?
Glenn Kent: Three.
Jim Bexfield: Had you met Jasper Welch
(later an Air Force Maj Gen) at that point?
Glenn Kent: Yes. I’d visited a Captain Welch
while he was working up at Livermore. He was
normally under the Research Directorate, but
we just had oversight of these guys. Another
we had oversight of was a guy by the name of
Lew Allen at Los Alamos, who later on became
the Air Force Chief of Staff. I knew of Jasper,
but that’s just sort of in passing. I went from
Albuquerque to the Air War College.
Jim Bexfield: You were a colonel at that point?
Glenn Kent: Yes.
Jim Bexfield: What did you do for fun in
Albuquerque?
Glenn Kent: Well, worked. (Laughing) There
wasn’t a whole lot to do there. However, the
people at Kirtland Air Force Base were a pretty
closely knit family, and there was an officers’
club and so on. I wasn’t particularly the most
popular guy on the base. There was a one-star
head of the Center and then there’s a Base Com-
mander who commanded Kirtland Air Force
Base. I’m a tenant on the base, and I’m a nui-
sance to them. They don’t look at it that they’re
there to serve the tenant. They look at it, ‘‘We’re
here; those damned tenants are a bother.’’
(Laughing)
I didn’t get along toowell with them on sev-
eral accounts. One is worth repeating. They
came up with a base evacuation plan, in case
of nuclear attack. Now in those days we stored
nuclear weapons at Manzano Base. The concept
was that when the bell rings, the B29s would
come to Kirtland Air Force Base, be loaded
with these weapons, which are trucked from
Manzano Base to Kirtland, and off they go to
war. Wow! So Manzano Base is a big target.
It was supposed then that Kirtland Air Force
Base was probably the prime target of the Soviet
Union if they attacked with bombers. So they
had a big air defense zone there. They wrote
an evacuation plan for Kirtland that had some
meaning because it seemed as though Kirtland
would be the target.
And it goes on and it says in the evacuation
plan that there aren’t too many ways out of
Albuquerque. It was a phone system alert like,
‘‘You phone Joe and Bill, and Bill phones two
other guys,’’ and so on, and it cascades upward.
But it adds parenthetically that this all should
be done quietly. We do not want to alert the
civilians in Albuquerque. They would clog the
roads. So there’s a big deal at the Center about
this plan, and everybody was congratulating
this guy about finally getting a plan, how we
certainly needed one and so on. So I started.
I said to them, ‘‘So this is the military in their
grandest image. It isn’t as though the captain
is deserting the ship; he’s deserting the ship
and fixing it so the passengers can’t.’’ (Laughing)
‘‘And here you are, saving these relics down
on the flight line—you know, World War II
vintage aircraft that have no purpose except
for flying hours by people that aren’t in combat
units.’’
I said, ‘‘You’ll be the laughing stock of this
community if this plan ever becomes known.’’
The next day a note came down from the Center
Commander that it wouldn’t be necessary for
me to attend staff meetings any more. (Laugh-
ing) But they trashed the plan, of course.
Bob Sheldon: Did you feel at home in Albu-
querque, since youwere close to Coloradowhere
you grew up?
Glenn Kent:No. It had a lot of the same char-
acteristics as Colorado. Flat, dry, and dusty.
(Laughing)Not as bad as southeastern Colorado.
Bob Sheldon: So you got picked up for the Air
War College. Did you enjoy your studies there?
Glenn Kent: I enjoyed the Air War College.
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Bob Sheldon:Did youwrite a paper at the Air
War College?
Glenn Kent: It wasn’t much of a paper. I re-
member the subject. As I look back now, I could
have taken on a bigger problem, but I didn’t.
The one thing that struckme—I noticed the guys
from these headquarters—both Headquarters
of the United States Air Force in Washington
and theHeadquarters SAC. And I said, ‘‘If that’s
the kind of guys that they have up there in
Plans, I canmakemyway in Plans.’’ I don’t have
a doctorate degree in math or physics, and I’m
not going to go very far in this research and de-
velopment business. So I’ll volunteer to go to
Plans in the Pentagon. Now if you’re so stupid
that you volunteer to go up to the Headquarters
of the United States Air Force in the Pentagon,
they have to give you the job. I founda jobwaiting
for me. Weapons Plan Division, but don’t read
that as just all weapons. It was nuclear weapons.
But they didn’t call it that for reasons of image.
They just called it the Weapons Plan Division.
So I volunteered to go to that. As a vice-
division—I don’t know whether they call them
Commanders of those divisions or not. I had
volunteered to go there and they sent me. That
was the big turning point in my career. I went
from being a colonel that was invited not to
attend staff meetings to being the fair-haired
boy. I worked for the most dominant three-star
general in the Air Force, Gen Gerhart [John K.].
And I did that because of my knowledge about
nuclear weapons.
In the original bomb, you inserted the nu-
clear device in the end of the bomb, in flight.
Now Los Alamos had come up with that sealed
pit test and that’s what came up—that’s what
was the Armed Forces basic weapons project
for nuclear—it reads nuclear weapons. And they
came up with a big cascade to railing against
‘‘sealed pit’’ weapons.
Bob Sheldon: Sealed pit. What’s that?
Glenn Kent: It’s a sealed pit—the pit being
the plutonium. It’s in the sphere, and it’s sealed.
It’s in the bomb to beginwith. They thought that
was too dangerous. But I started looking at it
and I decided it wasn’t. There was nomore dan-
ger in that than any other concept. They gave
a briefing before Gen Gerhart and I argued that
I thought some of the things they said were
wrong technically. And they were.
Up until that point, Gerhart was inclined to
go along with AFSWP (the Armed Forces Spe-
cial Weapons Project [The Armed Forces Special
Weapons Project was formed under a Navy Ad-
miral at first, and reports directly to the Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Now they’d
report to the USD(AT&L), the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Lo-
gistics.]). Because they’re the Oracle on nuclear
weapons. They’re the organization formed for
this purpose for all three services. So we had
that session and Gerhart called me back in af-
ter. He said, ‘‘Where did you learn so much
about the bomb?’’ I said, ‘‘Well I was stationed
at Albuquerque for a couple of years, and
working on this very subject.’’ That impressed
him and I became his Mr. Everybody for nu-
clearweapons—even towhether it’d be a deter-
rent and everything else. Even the subjects
that were not technical. But of course, we did
go the sealed pit way. It turned out that other
people in AFSWP agreed with me; there was
a great division of opinion down there. So
this briefing that was given was taken off the
street.
That put me in with Gerhart. Gerhart is
one of the great unsung heroes of the Air Force
in my view. He was a SAC general in 1960 or
thereabouts. I was in Plans for about four years.
He put together a briefing that said we’re not
going to have TAC turn nuclear like SAC. That’s
exactly what TAC was trying to do, to get into
the megaton business. There’s a SAC general
way back there, saying nuclear weapons are an
unusable force. He said, ‘‘I’m not going to say
that publicly. That’s what guides me. We’re go-
ing to make TAC into the best conventional
force the world has ever seen.’’ A SAC general.
He could get away with that because LeMay,
who was then Vice Chief, and Tommy White,
who was then Chief, liked him. Gerhart could
get away with it.
He liked me, and I was his chart maker. By
that I mean he told me what he wanted to say,
and I’d put it on the chart, and I wouldn’t have
misspelled words and wrong syntax or any-
thing. After two or three tries, I’d get it about
right, and that was way above anybody else.
So I became his chart maker. I didn’t actually
paint the charts. Somebody else did. It was on
paper. We didn’t have PowerPoint.
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He put together a briefing that became fa-
mous, turned the Air Force around. He saidwe’re
going to buy F-4s from McDonnell Douglas.
That didn’t set well with a lot of parts of the
Air Force because the F-4 was a Navy airplane.
But he said we’re going to do this. We’re going
to put more money in TAC than SAC. That’s
heresy. These were all his ideas. Not mine. And
that’s important to the story, because then a
new general came in from SAC. Before he came
in, I reported directly to Maj Gen (later Lt Gen)
Glen Martin who reported to Gerhart. And now
all of a sudden I reported to this general who re-
ports to Gen Martin, who reports to Gerhart.
Another layer. He knows about this briefing
so he wants to hear it. I go in there and I don’t
get by the first two charts—he says, ‘‘Where
you getting all this stuff, Colonel?’’ I didn’t say
from Gerhart. I tried to defend the chart on the
merit of the case, and he informed me that he
made policy, and colonels didn’t. In effect, he
said, ‘‘Throw the chart out.’’ What he did say
specifically, ‘‘I want a cost-effectiveness anal-
ysis of megatons delivered by F-4s dropping
1,000-pound bombs versus B-47s droppingmega-
ton bombs.’’ I said, ‘‘It’s not a relevant com-
parison. Obviously the B-47 is going to win.
It takes quite a few 1,000-pound bombs to make
a megaton.’’
So he, in effect, throws me out. He’s at
me again about two days later. This time we
make progress. We get through another two
charts. And he is just livid. He said, ‘‘Have
you made the analysis yet?’’ I said, ‘‘No.’’
‘‘Do you know how to do it?’’ ‘‘Yes. I could do
it in a heartbeat.’’ He says, ‘‘I’m taking you off
this project.’’ ‘‘Well, I’m not on the project be-
cause I’m in the Weapons Plan Division. I’m
on the project that Gerhart put me on to make
the charts.’’
Jim Bexfield: What’d he say when you said
that?
Glenn Kent: I said, ‘‘You’ll have to check that
with Gen Gerhart.’’ He said, ‘‘I will.’’ And he
went up to Gen Gerhart and explained to Gen
Gerhart he’d taken me off this project because
of my weird ideas—all of them are Gerhart’s.
(Laughing) So that afternoon I was working di-
rectly for Gen Gerhart.
Jim Bexfield: And this other general didn’t
get too far?
Glenn Kent: Yes, that’s right. That was a bit
of luck there. So Gerhart kept giving me better
and better jobs. One job he gave me that stands
out was—there was an argument about the
strike plan—SAC had a strike plan, the Navy
had a strike plan for their submarines, and the
Air Force had a strike plan for their bombers.
They used the word ‘‘loosely coordinated’’ but
that just meant—I’ll show you part of what I’m
doing. Each one.
That was underlying, but people came
up with the idea of having—which we have
today—a CINC SAC. Well, it isn’t called SAC.
It’s Strategic Command now. And the subma-
rines would be assigned to that. But that, of
course, sent the Navy through the roof. But
the die is cast. At first it was an organizational
problem of putting together that command.
Putting the submarines under them. I am doing
this thing, and I’ve got enough to do without
worrying about what those guys are doing
down there in Doctrine.
Gerhart called me in and he said, ‘‘I just
came from the Chief’s office, and he said, we
can’t afford to lose this, so I’m putting you on
it.’’ ‘‘Yes, sir.’’ So I go back two days later and
say, ‘‘Gen Gerhart, if your position is you can’t
afford to lose, you’d better change your posi-
tion. Let’s stake out a position we can win.
And that position is there will be a Single In-
tegrated Ops Plan (SIOP). Each word is opera-
tive. Single plan. Integrated. It’s an operations
plan, making the best use of what you have.
And it is a plan. Let’s forget this business of
command authority. It doesn’t matter. As long
as there’s a Single Integrated Op Plan, what does
it matter? So there’ll be a joint strategic plan-
ning staff established at SAC at Omaha. Run
by CINC SAC with a Navy Admiral three-star
under him. But a joint staff. And they’ll come
up with a Single Integrated Op Plan.’’
Now it seems like that has motherhood
written all over it. But the Navy resisted that
mightily, because they abandoned their first ef-
forts and this is just a way—a slippery slope of
getting there. Their real purpose is to get their
subs out from under CINC SAC. The water’s
already poisoned. So they resisted it mightily.
That’s probably an understatement. It went on
and on. The Secretary of Defense got wind of
this, of course, and was firmly convinced that
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that was the way we ought to go. So for a period
of six months I did nothing but live and breathe
the idea of this SIOP.
Bob Sheldon: Did you coin the term SIOP?
Glenn Kent: Yes.
Jim Bexfield: Who was the Secretary of De-
fense at that time?
Glenn Kent: Thomas Gates. An investment
banker from Philadelphia and a brilliant man.
Bless his soul. So I go ahead—and of course,
I’m briefing Gerhart about this about every other
day. So I havepretty close ties toGerhart andGen
White. One day Gerhart calls me in and says,
‘‘Let’s review the bidding. Your plan is—you’ve
finagled around so that they’re going to have
a trial run out there at Omaha on this. The idea
being if the trial run succeeds, that’s a big step
toward getting that whole procedure approved.
The Navy has resisted that, but we’ve got the
Secretary of Defense to demand that there be
a trial run. And then you finagled around and
got the Secretary of Defense to sign a letter that
says .’’—it wasn’t the letter I sent up there,
but Gates changed it. My letter said I’m work-
ing clandestinely through Gates’ military assis-
tant, Brig Gen George Brown (later Chief of
Staff of the Air Force and then Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff).
Jim Bexfield: Yes, I used to work for him.
Glenn Kent: Yes. And in the letter I fash-
ioned they would go to Omaha on the 18th of
December, 1960, to review the plan. Gates signed
it to approve the plan. But I’ll accept blessings
when I see them. Which is a bigger bite to chew.
And so I told Gerhart—when Gerhart said,
‘‘You’ve done extremely well. You’ve maneu-
vered this thing bureaucratically through every
nook and cranny and nowwe’re in a pretty good
position, and your idea is they’ll go out there to
Omaha and brief the plan, and Gates will ap-
prove it. Or at least nod. And then if the plan is
split by the services, it goes up for adjudication
and you win.’’ That was my PERT diagram.
‘‘We need more convincing proof that he
will approve the plan. Work on it. I’m not satis-
fied that we’re going to win this on the merits
of the case out there.’’ ‘‘Yes, sir.’’ The traffic go-
ing home that night was particularly bad, and
an idea, which turned out to be brilliant, came
to my mind. I learned from this that semantics
matter.
The plan is an ops plan. It’s to make the best
use of force. It is silent as to whether that out-
come is acceptable or not. The argument is best
use of force. Best use of force has to do with
whether you send this weapon at this DGZ,
Designated Ground Zero, or another one. So
I’ve narrowed the argument down to best use
of force; it’s a matter of DGZs.
‘‘My plan is, Gen Gerhart, that we will
sharpen up this argument as a matter of DGZs
to the point where Gen Thomas Power, bless
his soul, at SACwill convene a group twoweeks
before the 18th of December out there to say—
and at the end of the meeting, he will quietly
say, ‘Do any of you have any changes to the
DGZs?’ Hopefully there will be a few changes.
We accept all the changes, regardless of merit;
and therefore, they have bought the plan.’’
(Laughing)
Gerhart looked at me and said, ‘‘You think
it’ll work?’’ I said, ‘‘I don’t know.’’ Gerhart said,
‘‘We’ll try.’’ So he goes up and explains this to
the Chief of Staff, Gen Thomas White. White
calls Power and he said, ‘‘I can’t explain to
you what I have in mind, but no problem, Gen
Power. I’ll send the Colonel out there and he’ll
explain it to you.’’ So that afternoon I foundmy-
self in a C-47 against strong headwinds making
our way to Omaha. I arrived there about 5:00.
Staff car meets me to whisk me up to the pres-
ence of Gen Power. I’d never had a conversation
one-on-one with Gen Power before in my life.
He doesn’t knowme fromAdam.Well, he knows
me, because of my work on the site all of these
days and months, but he says, ‘‘What do you
have?’’ So I have to explain it to him. He lis-
tened intently. He looks at me. He says, ‘‘That
smells of entrapment.’’ (Laughing) ‘‘Four-star
generals don’t do that.’’ He says, ‘‘I said that
smells of entrapment.’’ I said, ‘‘It is.’’ He said,
‘‘I’ll do it.’’ And he did it masterfully.
He came out there on the 18th of December.
There was an argument about factors that af-
fected the outcome of the plan. Gen Power got
up at about 11:00 in front of this group. All the
rank of the universe is assembled there. Gen
White barely made the first row.
Bob Sheldon: Were you there?
Glenn Kent: Oh, yes. In the back sitting by
Gen Gerhart. Each service could have one ac-
tion officer in the room. So, we told Gen Power,
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‘‘I’ll take it back there.’’ At 11:00 was my first di-
agram. At 1:00 he’s through this. But the other
arguments had gone on, and everybody is get-
ting mad, and irritated, and lunch is past due.
Gerhart says, ‘‘Did he (Power) understand?’’ I
said, ‘‘Yes, sir.’’ ‘‘Well, where is it?’’ Power was
waiting for the right time. He got up and with
great eloquence recited this argument about
the plan—as far as the plan’s concerned, that’s
my job that they offer it. There is no disagree-
ment. A hush fell over the room.
Secretary Gates was an investment banker.
He took over, and from there on it was slam
dunk. Gates said, ‘‘That is the most remarkable
statement.’’ And he recited it. So as far as the
plan is concerned, there’s no disagreement. He
queried the Navy about it and the Navy did
about as bad as they could rebutting it, acting
like they’d never sent the memo in, and Power
has it right there in front of him. Thememo from
the Navy Admiral out there. The Navy Admiral
said, ‘‘On something like that I’d have to refer
it to the headquarters.’’ And that just blewGates
right out of the water. He said, ‘‘What have you
been doing out here for the last three months?
That’s what you were sent out here for. To de-
velop the plan. And now you act like this is
a new subject?’’ So he was just scathing in his
attack against the Navy. And then he suddenly
stood up and said, ‘‘I have a farm to save. The
plan will be approved. Without further discus-
sion. Without change. And today.’’
Admiral Burke of the Navy, a very re-
sourceful gentleman, said, ‘‘It would be rather
awkward if Congress were informed that you
coerced the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] into ap-
proving these plans before they were submitted
to them formally.’’ I thought, oh, my—of all the
things I thought of, I’d forgotten to send it to
them. They’d been briefed on it over and over,
but it hadn’t been submitted formally. So Gates
recovered by saying, ‘‘You have a point Admiral.
I amend my former statement as follows. The
plan will be approved, without further discus-
sion, tomorrow morning at 9:00.’’
So all these four-star admirals and generals
had to unpack their bags. They had planned
on parting later that afternoon. (Laughing) And
Power says, ‘‘There will be a reception at the
officers’ club at 6:30.’’ He nods for me to get
up and tell his staff what’s going on, so I did.
The rest is history. But it turns out that’s how
I got promoted to general. Power saw to it.
Bob Sheldon: How many months after that
were you promoted?
Glenn Kent: It was a year or so. I found out
later that Power took extraordinary measures.
He became embarrassingly my supporter. Like
telling his own staff, ‘‘If Col Kent said so, it must
be right.’’ (Laughing) Telling his own staff off.
So, I have a different image of Gen Power than
a lot of people.
Jim Bexfield: What kind of image do the
others have?
Glenn Kent: A rather demanding guy and
all. Not very friendly. And whatever he says
goes.
But that’s a rather interesting study, in effect
analysis without numbers. But that it pays to
worry things around until you get down to the
nitty-gritty of it. So Imademyway. As a colonel,
in winning arguments. I didn’t win them, but
I worked for important people and I helped
them win arguments.
Bob Sheldon: How long did you stay in that
job?
Glenn Kent: I stayed in Plans for about
a good four years. I went to Harvard in 1961,
I think.
Bob Sheldon: What were some of the other
hot topics that you worked on in the Plans
Division?
Glenn Kent: I had a pretty good job as a
colonel in Plans, in nuclear weapons. They
had the Weapons Plans Division, but don’t
think weapons systems, don’t think nuclear
weapons—it’s namedWeapons Plans to not at-
tract too much attention. In those days, we
dealt with the Rainbow team and the JCS about
the fabrication of nuclear weapons for the next
year and the allocation of them. So that was an
ongoing tussle.
Each year, in those days, the Department
of Defense had to send to the Atomic Energy
Commission an order for the weapons they’d
build during the next year. We were on a pluto-
nium diet; there was just so much plutonium.
Meaning each weapon took so much plutonium
and the amount of plutonium total couldn’t be
larger than a certain number because the AEC
couldn’t create any more. That order came out
of the JCS and the Secretary of Defense. They
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had meetings and the JCS asked about this. It
went on and on. And wrangling around what
weapons. For example, the Army was using a
lot of plutonium in their Davy Crockett system
and that takes plutonian away from bombs for
the SAC—have you ever heard of Davy Crockett?
Bob Sheldon: No.
Glenn Kent: It’s a small weapon. The idea
was that they would use it on a tactical basis
in Europe. Mainly to blow up bridges. It would
stop the Soviet advance and make choke points.
They wanted a whole bunch of them, and that
took money; but more importantly, it took a lot
of plutonium. The amount of plutonium in a
bomb is practically independent of the yield. It
takes about the same amount of plutonium for
the primary. So that was a continual thing. We
worried about it.
After the weapons are built, they’re allo-
cated. Whether they go to SAC or CINC PAC
or the Army orwherever. Some of them, it’s pre-
ordained. If it’s a Davy Crockett, it obviously
goes to wherever the Army says. But there was a
contest between the Navy carrier air and B-47s. I
did pretty well on that by inventing the idea of
loading to force.
I invented the load to force and this would
just drive these guys up the wall down in the
Joint Staff, because they wanted to argue about
how much more space do we have to destroy,
howmany industrial things—andmy argument
was that other people would make policy and
they have built this many B-47s; it’s our humble
duty to load them. So I avoided much of this
policy debate about how much do you have to
destroy and so forth.
We had load factors in those days of about
80 percent, as I recall. Meaning our B-47 and
B-52 aircraft on SIOP alert were loaded only at
the 80 percent level. As a matter of fact, that car-
ried the day. When I took over that division,
my predecessor was inclined to be in the policy
business—all about how much destruction is
necessary in our retaliatory strike. And that’s
a never-ending subject, retaliation. A lot of so-
cial science in it.
I invented the idea of the load factor. There’s
somebody way above my pay grade as a lowly
colonel who has decided to build these B-47s
and B-52s and it’s my beholden duty to load
them to the best effect.
I avoided the political science bit of this
about how much do we need and I drove
them—the Army and Navy—wild on that argu-
ment. To the pointwhere theNavyCaptain said,
‘‘If you give that speech one more time, I’ll
throw up.’’ And I said, ‘‘Get a bag.’’
On load factor, I could look very generous.
I would load the Navy aircraft up to 90 per-
cent while SAC was at 80. SAC didn’t like
that. But I pointed out, ‘‘Look, this thing goes
up for split to the OSD. We’ve got to be on the
side of motherhood. 90 for Navy and they’re
complaining about 80 percent for SAC?’’ I
could do that because there weren’t many
Navy aircraft. I could load them out and it
doesn’t affect my load factor too much. But
at least I got the load factor in there as a guid-
ing principle.
Later on, Gen James Ferguson wants to give
me the job of Development Planning in Sys-
tems Command at Andrews. It was a short con-
versation. I said, ‘‘Gen Ferguson, I’ll take the
command if Development Planningmeans plan-
ning the developments of this command.’’ Pause.
That’s quite a difference fromwhat they’re doing
now. That’s how I said, that’s what the name
said. He looks at me, done deal. So you know I
have great leverage. I’m planning the develop-
ments of this command and I took this charge
very seriously, and a lot of other people didn’t
think that was my business. The guy before me
is writing some obscure document called the
Technology Roadmap of the Air Force or some-
thing. Just stuff like that, that nobody paid at-
tention to.
Jim Bexfield: And then Gen Rogers followed
you?
Glenn Kent: Yes, well on down—he worked
for mewhen I went there. Ferguson liked Rogers
so he said I’m giving you Brig Gen Felix Rogers
[later head of Logistics Command] to work for
you. He was a great guy and very able.
When I took over that job, development
planning was writing such obscure and useless
things. They weren’t actually writing them, but
they were fostering them. The plan for techno-
logical warfare—I don’t believe such a thing
existed. But I had a choice whether I went down
there or not. I had said to Gen Ferguson, ‘‘If de-
velopment planning means planning the de-
velopment to this command, I’ll take the job.’’
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He winced a little bit. I said ‘‘Well, that’s evi-
dently what it means.’’
He said, ‘‘OK.’’ So I took the charge very
seriously—planning the development of this
command. I planned what concepts we would
underwrite or implement. I never got a direct
charter for that, but I acted like I had one. Gen
Ferguson, the only comment he ever made was
one day he said, ‘‘I think you’re taking that
statement a little too seriously.’’ But he never
did say no.
Up until that time it was more or less left
to the Center Commander as to what they did.
There was no central direction. There was Air
Force Electronics Development Command at
Hanscom Air Force Base and Lt Gen Kenneth
Schultzhad BMO and there was another center
for space. They were later combined, as I recall;
they were separate then. So I take that seri-
ously and that carried over from Systems Com-
mand when I was transferred to take Studies
andAnalysis. I said, ‘‘Well now I’m in a real good
position to plan the developments of this com-
mand.’’ I never did have a charter for it, but it
was there because I had the ear of the Chief.
Bob Sheldon: What were the major projects
you had going on under you in that job?
Glenn Kent: The F-15 was one, which I
nursed along. I didn’t have anything to do with
the technical aspects of it, but I saw to it that
Gen Schriever [Gen Bernard Schriever] got
money to pursue his path toward putting sat-
ellites in space, and so on. I was more or less
along for the ride, just to help monitor at the
headquarters if some guy didn’t cut his money.
Minuteman was another project. The concept
of Minuteman had already been described. All
I had to do was to ride herd and see that some-
body doesn’t cut the money in my favorite
project.
Bob Sheldon: Somewhere along the line you
went to Harvard?
Glenn Kent: Yes, I spent a little over four
years in Weapons Plans Division of the Director
of Plans at the headquarters under Maj Gen
Glen Martin. He had a remarkable group of col-
onels working for him. At one time Gen Martin,
a two-star general (later a three-star), had as the
Director of Plans, Gen Russell Dougherty. They
were all colonels then, ColDougherty, Col Robert
Dixon, Col William Goade, Col David Harbour,
andmyself. And all those colonelsmade general,
and some of them made four-star general.
After four years of working endlessly at
night and so on, I went to Harvard to the Center
for International Affairs.
Bob Sheldon: How did you get picked for
that Harvard assignment?
Glenn Kent: Gen Martin put my name in I
think. I was through with my tour at the head-
quarters, so I went to Harvard for a year. The
Center for International Affairs. It’s, in some re-
spects, not my cup of tea, because this center
was populated by people from the foreign ser-
vices of 14 countries, like France, Italy, Germany,
Argentina, Indonesia, Cyprus, Japan, Korea. So
it was all about diplomatic matters and political
science, not about.
Bob Sheldon: No mathematics involved?
Glenn Kent: Well, I got it involved, but that
wasn’t the name of the game. That was an inter-
esting course. It had a strong economics flavor.
Each member of the group had to present two
seminars during the course and that meant
you had to write a paper, 10 pages or so long,
hand it in, and be prepared to defend it at the
seminar. The seminar wasn’t to brief the paper,
it was to discuss the paper, and one of those
had to be on economics. So I postponed that as
long as possible, because some of the people at
the seminars were graduate students from Har-
vard. And some of these guys had been sent
around the world to help people in their eco-
nomics and I’m to give a seminar? By that time
I had thoroughly antagonized them so I knew
they’d have their sharp knives out, but I
avoided it by giving a presentation. ‘‘For shame,
for shame, for shame.’’ I went through with me-
ticulous detail all of these disasters that they
had caused to these developing countries trying
to make them into an economic structure like
ours. I said, ‘‘I have often wondered what I
should do after I retire from themilitary tomake
up for what I’ve done to humanity by being
in themilitary, and now I know I shall go around
the world protecting the innocent people from
the likes of you.’’
Bob Sheldon: Did they draw their spears on
you?
Glenn Kent: Well, yes, of course they didn’t
like it and there was a heated discussion, but
it’s on my turf. I’m not obliged to know about
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economics. All I have to know is that they made
a disaster out of some of these nations by taking
them out of their tribal habitats and trying to
make them make shoes in a shoe factory. They
forgot all about the well-being of the nation
and tried to make the shoe factory a profitable
one.
Bob Sheldon: What was the other seminar
you gave?
Glenn Kent: For the other seminar, I was
on fairly solid ground, but it was not to their
liking. It was about arms control, and I was pro-
testing the approach to arms control where they
restrict the number of missiles you can have,
and let the size of the missile grow and don’t
try to constrain that. I accurately predicted that
that would be a disaster someday. This was the
days before MIRV.
Bob Sheldon:What did you base your analy-
sis on?
Glenn Kent: That we ought to constrain, for
example, the volume of missiles and just let
them have so much total volume of missiles. If
they want to make small missiles and more of
them, within that stated constraint of volume,
that’s what I want you to do. I am constraining
your destructive power, but letting the survival
float.
I carried that through for a long time and it
finally carried the day, years later with Nunn,
and after I retired, with Nunn in the Senate.
That began my theme about constraining
throw weight; that’s the same as constraining
volume, constraining throw weight. And that’s
a tale unto itself. I pushed that idea in many di-
rections over the years. That was in 1963. It
started at Harvard. As amatter of fact, I brought
it to a head there and got some converts. They
had a joint arms control seminar there that met
every other month. It was joint between MIT
and Harvard. They met at the Faculty Club at
Harvard, because they had a better club than
MIT did. Two guys, one guy from Harvard
and one from MIT, had been commissioned by
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA) inWashington to develop an arms con-
trol agreement, a tentative one, a trial run. You
know this is the early days of arms control. They
gave a briefing on it and I pointed out that
you’re doing the wrong thing. You’re con-
straining the survivability measures and not
constraining the destructive power and we’ll
pay for that later on. Well, they didn’t, you
know, what does a colonel from the Air Force
know anyhow, because Harvard was a hotbed
of antimilitary in those days. So ensued a fairly
lively debate. But Dr. Tom Schelling came to me
after that meeting and said, ‘‘You’re right.’’
He wrote the master book The Strategy of
Conflict in 1960, taught the Strategy of Conflict
at Harvard. I took it when I was at Harvard in
the Center. I skipped every seminar I dared
and went to his courses. But he said, ‘‘You’re
right, so I want you to flesh that out and make
a presentation of it,’’ which I did. So in due time
I presented it at Harvard. The deck was stacked
against me because those guys didn’t like the
military. They didn’t like the fact that a colonel
in the Air Force was telling those revered pro-
fessors that they might be wrong.
How dare you? So I didn’t get through the
briefing. After the briefing, Dr. Schelling and
Professor Robert Bowie, who was the Director
of the Center, and Dr. Henry Kissinger were
there. Dr. Kissinger had been the Associate Di-
rector of the Center from 1957 to 1960 and Direc-
tor of the Harvard Defense Studies Program
from 1958 to 1971. Kissinger came to me and
said, ‘‘I think you’re right.’’ I think he forgot it
later on, or didn’t adhere to it, but anyhow they
scheduled me again. This time Schelling and
Bowie both get up to introduce it and said,
‘‘His logic is impeccable. His math is right. Just
listen.’’ And they admonished me, ‘‘Don’t rise
to the bait, you know? They’ll say bad things
but just let it ride.’’ So I did and I got through it.
Bob Sheldon: What were the bad things they
said about it?
Glenn Kent: They weren’t substantive. The
verification. But I said I’m just constraining vol-
ume and you can measure volume. These are
history professors and political science profes-
sors, and math is not their cup of tea.
Finally at the end of that second session,
a Dr. Somebody with a foreign accent, a history
professor there, said, ‘‘Colonel, by your mathe-
matics you have taken and made a complicated
subject impossible to understand.’’ So I forgot
Schelling’s admonishment and I said, ‘‘I’m
sorry you said that Doctor,’’ and he presses on
and I said, ‘‘I’ll tell you why I’m sorry. I went
to a little old teacher’s college. You’d have
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spitting contempt for their standard of excel-
lence in math. But if I went back there and said,
‘Dr. Schuhmann, look at this math.’ He would
look at me coldly and say, ‘My dear young
man that is only simple arithmetic.’ So if you
don’t understand it, I would advise you don’t
tell anybody.’’
To continue that story, when I’m in WSEG
(the Weapons System Evaluation Group) I con-
vinced the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul
Nitze, of this so he bought into it. This is when
I had WSEG, and they had an arms control
agreement fashioned over there in ACDA. And
Kissinger was the head of the National Security
Council; he was the national security adviser,
and he sent it to the Secretary of Defense for
a review. Then he had this team review it. It
was a loaded deck. There were four proposals,
three of them lousy and one of them not. In
my view, they were all pretty bad, but one
not as bad as the others. So that’s all they
wanted, was an endorsement of number two.
It was just a pro forma exercise so they could
say to the Congress, ‘‘Have you consulted the
military?’’ ‘‘Oh yes, we have, we sent it to the
Secretary of Defense and they voted for num-
ber two.’’
So I had a report fashioned, after some dif-
ficulty, but I inserted in the report a section
2A. Now notice I just call it 2A, so he could take
it out and nobody would know the difference.
It reads right along. It’s just that 2A is inserted
in there, and 2A said essentially the follow-
ing: ‘‘Number two is the least worst, but all
the proposals have the serious flaw in that
they constrain the defense or other survivability
measures and do not constrain the offense, the
destructive capability.’’ It was in the context of
a duel between ICBMs. So I went to Nitze and
said, ‘‘Now Dr. Nitze, I don’t want to make
any unnecessary waves and you notice what
I’ve done here, I’ve inserted section 2A. Sec-
tion 2A has the concurrence, as we stand here,
of exactly one mind—mine. Of all the people
on that group, CIA ACDA, State Department,
JCS, Army, Navy, Air Force, none of them con-
curred with that.’’ So I said, ‘‘There’s only one
person that wants that section 2A in there, so
you don’t have to put it in. It’s your call, if you
say don’t put it in, I’ll just say, yes sir.’’ Nitze
thought a little bit and said, ‘‘I’ll get back to
you tomorrow.’’ He called me the next day and
said, ‘‘It stays.’’
We sent it over there across the river. Nitze
goes on an extended trip someplace. They wait
until Nitze’s gone and call me and said, ‘‘Thank
you very much, for that report. It was excellent,
except just delete section 2A.’’ So I said, ‘‘I’m
not at liberty to do so.’’ This was somebody
working for Kissinger calling on behalf of
Kissinger, although he was careful not to say
so. And I said, ‘‘I’m not at liberty to do so.
Dr. Paul Nitze said put it in and I can’t, in good
conscience, overrule that decision.’’ Well I could
have if I wanted to, but—and they put further
pressure to delete section 2A because that would
complicate matters over there. Finally they
ditched the whole report, rather than.
Jim Bexfield: How was 2A different from 2?
Glenn Kent: Well, no, my statement was I
didn’t write a proposal. I just said that this
wasn’t proposal 2A, it was section 2A. It was
just some remarks that said all of these arms
control proposals are flawed—including alter-
native 2, the fact that they were proposal 2 and
2A is just happenstance.
Bob Sheldon: Let’s get back in sequence with
you finishing up at Harvard. Any other notable
people that you met?
Glenn Kent: My office mate at Harvard was
Jo¨rg Kastl, a rather remarkable man. He was in
the German Army at the defeat of Stalingrad.
He and about a hundred other people made
it back all the way from Stalingrad back to
Germany by foot.
He later was the ambassador from Germany
to the Soviet Union. So we made friends with
people like that, from these foreign countries.
Another gentleman, Duk Choo Moon, became
a close friend. He was later Ambassador from
Korea to Belgium, Italy, and the United Nations.
We also made lasting friends of John Barnes
of England, who became Ambassador to the
Netherlands and Israel; Nikos Kranidiotis of
Cyprus, the longtime Ambassador to Greece;
and Ge´rard Gaussen, later Ambassador to
Sweden. My wife has kept in touch with all
of them for many years.
Jim Bexfield:Getting ready to leave Harvard,
did you have your assignment already in hand?
Glenn Kent: It was given to me, but I didn’t
particularly pick it. Dr. Harold Brown had
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known of me. He was then head of DD R&E, so
I suddenly found myself assigned to Dr. Brown,
as his military assistant for strategic matters.
That’s before he was Secretary of the Air Force,
and before he was Secretary of Defense. So that
was a very good assignment.
Bob Sheldon: Did you meet him before you
went to that job?
Glenn Kent: I don’t recall that I did. Some-
how or another he knew of me. I was his mili-
tary assistant for strategic matters and you
could do as much as you wanted or as little as
you wanted in that job. I was very lucky; early
on I got the ear of Dr. Brown. So he let it be
known to the people in PA&E (Program Analy-
sis and Evaluation), Dr. Alain Enthoven and
company, that anything they had to say, run it
through me before he would see it. They didn’t
want to particularly come to me, but they had
to. The way that Dr. Brown was on all of the
matters—he stuck to that rather religiously.
They’d try and give him a paper and he’d just
say, ‘‘I’ll read it when Gen Kent has seen it.’’
Well, I was a colonel at first, then I later made
general.
That put me in the spotlight in more than
just technical matters. McNamara, strangely
enough, had more confidence in Dr. Brown
about strategic matters of a political, or strate-
gic, nature than he did in the other people that
worked for him. In many cases he asked Brown
directly for a piece of paper; thatmade it clear he
didn’t want other people to know about it.
I ended up helping Dr. Brown in that role,
even to the point of reviewing McNamara’s tes-
timony to Congress. I didn’t write it, somebody
else did, but I had a hand in reviewing it. I
lucked out with Brown. It wasn’t that I was
never wrong, but he never knew it.
Jim Bexfield: Did he have a quantitative back-
ground? Was he in engineering or mathematics
or.?
Glenn Kent: Dr. Brown maxed the course in
math. That guy knew math upside down, over
and out. Dr. Brown had an amazing mind. He’d
work on a subject and I’d think, ‘‘How am I go-
ing to present it to him and get it through?’’ be-
cause he was an impatient person, and I’d go
as fast as I could. When I’m two-thirds of the
way through, he finishes it better than I could.
And he could remember things that happened.
I’d tell him something and then a month
later he’d say, ‘‘You said on such and such
a date, so-and-so.’’ ‘‘I did?’’ But I lucked out
pretty well with Dr. Brown. I hadn’t been there
but about a month when the Army came in
with a milestone briefing about a Nike-X.
Nike-X, in retrospect, was a flawed concept.
We didn’t know about hit to kill in those days.
The interceptors were armed with a nuclear
warhead.
And there was a lot of money going into
that effort. Of course it finally was canceled for
a variety of reasons. The Army had a briefing
about the effect—what difference it made to
have a defense called a Nike-X. They gave this
briefing and the defense looks pretty good. Dur-
ing the briefing, I had been taught by Schelling
at Harvard, ask yourself the question, ‘‘Who
has the last move?’’—and be careful. You better
settle that before you do anything else. Who has
the last move? It occurred to me in this concept,
that the offense, the Soviet Union, has the last
move.
They can see where we put these inter-
ceptors and tailor their tactics accordingly. So
they don’t have to attack the defended area to
kill people. They have the last move, but the
study by the Army had the inherent assump-
tion, not stated, that the United States had the
last move, in the following construct. They said
they had gone to the JCS and gotten an account
of the SIOP. The RISOP (the Red Integrated
Strategic Operational Plan) was allegedly the
Soviet equivalent of our SIOP.
Well, that’s nonsense because the Soviets
hadn’t developed it; somebody in JCS had.
The Soviets had the last move. They didn’t have
to adhere to it. So they had two weapons at a
certain number of DGZs, and each weapon had
one warhead and nine decoys.
Bob Sheldon: What’s a DGZ?
Glenn Kent: Designated Ground Zero. The
probability of intercepting an object was some
number like 0.75, so you could do a binomial
expansion and find the probability that one
weapon will detonate, two weapons will deto-
nate, or no weapons will detonate at the DGZ.
They looked pretty good, but they’ve got it
camouflaged and as always, they did a lot of
work. In retrospect, given their RISOP, you
could do the thing in an hour with a slide rule,
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with bad eyes. It’s just expanding the binomial
distribution at each of these places. But I said
to myself, I better keep still because I’m the
new man on the block here, and this is the first
time I’ve been exposed to this. Maybe I’m miss-
ing something. When the meeting was over, I
followed Dr. Fubini [Dr. Eugene G. Fubini, son
of mathematician Guido Fubini], a Brown dep-
uty. Dr. Fubini was the wild Italian. He had
many patents on radar and he was also a great
brain and a quick learner. I went back to him
and said, ‘‘I’m disturbed to no end about that
briefing.’’ And I went through the binomial—
there’s no guarantee that the Soviets would at-
tack like that. What if instead of sending two
weapons to that DGZ, they send three? I go from
being quite successful to dismal absolute cata-
strophic failure, by definition, because I spent
all my interceptors on the first two weapons.
Dr. Gene Fubini said, ‘‘Well how do you do it?
How do you think about it?’’ I said, ‘‘I don’t
know, but not this way.’’ He took me into
Dr. Brown immediately and Dr. Brown, we got
about halfway through it when he said, ‘‘Oh
my, what are we doing?’’ He called the Army
back in and said, ‘‘The construct is fatally flawed
and we have to start all over.’’
So about a day later he called me and said,
‘‘In addition to the Army, to think about this,
I’m giving the job to IDA (Institute for Defense
Analyses) and to you.’’ Of the three I was the
only one that came up with the answer, but
not by myself. I was beginning now to under-
stand that I had to balance the firing doctrine
at a battery: when he sees some incoming object,
he has to balance leakage versus exhaustion.
If he’s totally concerned with leakage, he fires
everything he’s got at those. If he’s worried
about exhaustion, he thinks a little bit about that
because there might be another weapon coming
that he doesn’t know about. And somebody said
there are two guys at Bell Labs that addressed
this about a year ago and wrote a paper.
So I got in touch with them. The two guys
were Dr. Robert Prim and Dr. Thornton Read.
So I got hold of Bob Prim. He said, ‘‘I’d be glad
to come down and show you that paper,’’ which
he did. He had the math in it just absolutely
elegant. So I picked it up and incorporated it
into my analysis of the effective expenses and
handed it to Brown as a trial balloon. Brown
bought it and that became the method of doing
it. Inherent in it was the Prim/Read theory. I
made Bob Prim and Thorton Read famous or
notorious, with the Prim/Read theory. The con-
struct was to make the marginal return of RV
that the Soviets could send to the United States
the same. That means on defended sites you
put in more interceptors than the others. Some
interceptors you don’t put in, because the worth
of the target is so poor, so low—so that its mar-
ginal return, even if it’s one interceptor defend-
ing, is about the same. It’s about what you’re
gearing up for.
So the construct was there’s a price you
charge per target and beyond that price you
can have it for free, if he pays the price. But
the price he pays is purported to be the worth
of the target divided by some constant, like
lambda. And lambda is what you decide to
make the defense, it’s the marginal return that
you’ll accept. The lower the lambda, the more
interceptions you have to have, because you
have to charge a higher price. And you can con-
nect the relationship between the price you de-
cide to charge, and the number of interceptions
you have to have.
So I did that and Brown thought it was
great, told IDA to put it on the computer, told
STR, scratch that—whatever company on the
West Coast was under contract to the Army—to
follow this approach. The contractor on theWest
Coast bought it. They didn’t have any problem.
They thought it was absolutely right on. The
only trouble was they were incompetent com-
puter programmers. They just couldn’t get their
computer there to do what they wanted it to do.
This was back in 1965 or 1966 or there-
abouts. Computers weren’t user friendly then.
IDA took a different stance. It bothered them
to no end that some Air Force general figured
this out. I didn’t figure it out. Well I did in part,
but I didn’t figure it out as elegantly as Prim and
Read did. I copied it. So they wanted to review
the approach and they almost got fired for it. Be-
cause Brown would then give me ‘‘what ifs.’’
You know, ‘‘What if the probability of kill of
the interceptors is 0.6 instead of 0.75? What if
the total attack is more RVs?What about decoys
and all that?’’ I could handle those ‘‘what ifs.’’
After I got it set up, it’d take me about an hour
and a half to do each ‘‘what if,’’ with a Friden
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calculator. Brown found out and he said,
‘‘I thought I was setting it up for IDA to do these
‘what ifs’?’’ I said, ‘‘They’re over there still figur-
ing out the theory.’’ So they got a stern reprimand
from Brown because of that.
He said, ‘‘Well how about the company on
the West Coast?’’ He said, ‘‘Go out there until
they can do it right.’’ And I said, ‘‘It’s easier on
me if I do the ‘what ifs’ myself with my Friden
calculator. Just give me one guy to help me.
Then wait until they make that computer out
there do their bidding.’’ So I became the calcu-
lator for defense.
The Armywas quite cooperative about this.
They made the Nike-X look far less effective
than they had, but the top echelon of the Army
never had a problem with that.
Bob Sheldon: Did you understand the Prim/
Read algorithm? Could you follow that your-
self?
Glenn Kent: Oh, yes, absolutely. There’s
nothing complicated about it. As a matter of
fact, Bob Prim described it to me in the morn-
ing. By afternoon I had a formula that explicitly
showed the relationship between the number
of interceptors and the price you’re going to
charge.
Bob Sheldon: Something you could program
on the hand calculator now.
Glenn Kent: Well, I can write the formula
down and solve it with a slide rule. There are
pocket calculators you can program in the for-
mula. I never did, because we didn’t have
pocket calculators in those days. We had Friden
calculators.
Bob Sheldon: Based on the results you gave,
did Dr. Brown change some of his acquisition
decisions?
Glenn Kent: He began to have worries
about defense. That and the Soviet threat. He
then began to have misgivings about it, but
at that stage there was no termination of the
Nike-X. The goal then was to make it work.
Later on—the demise of theNike-Xwaswrapped
up into a larger thing called damage limitation.
Along the way, about every four years, while
they have a.
Jim Bexfield: Not the QDR?
Glenn Kent: Yes, the QDR, I don’t think they
called it a QDR in those days, but it’s the same
thing. And there were many issues to address.
A gentleman, an analyst who worked for
Enthoven by the name of Dr. Frank Trinkl, was
in charge of an organizing effort to address
these issues. It was a smorgasbord of issues, 20
in all. Some of them cast a long shadow and to
say I’m going to get an ad hoc group in to study
this and get a worthwhile product is nonsense.
It was a disaster waiting to happen.
He wanted me on it and I declined. So they
went to Brown and said, ‘‘We asked that Gen
Kent be on it and he said ‘No.’’’ So Brown calls
me in and I said, ‘‘Dr. Brown, it’s a disaster wait-
ing to happen.’’ He said, ‘‘Your charge is to join
that group and keep it from happening.’’ So I
said, reluctantly, ‘‘Yes, sir.’’ I went down there
and tried to reorganize the effort. And I pointed
out to Dr. Trinkl that of the 20 items, eight had
to do with limiting damage to the United States
from a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. Why
don’t we bundle those together and just study
damage limitation? And see what mix we should
have of civil defense, active defense, bomber
defense, and counterforce, in order to limit dam-
age to the United States. So that even in a second
strike I can attack his residual forces with coun-
terforce to decrease the attack on the United
States.
That’s an uphill grind, because we had to
do it both ways. So for Soviet first strike the
counterforce isn’t a strong player, you see? US
damage can only depend on civil defense and
active defense, Nike-X and bomber defense.
So Dr. Trinkl said, ‘‘That would require
a lot of analysis.’’ I said, ‘‘Right.’’ But he said,
‘‘We can’t do it. We just don’t have the forces
to do it,’’ and I think he was absolutely right.
But quite illogically he said, ‘‘That’s too hard
to handle. We’ll go back to where we were,’’
which is studying the 20 issues, including the
eight. That shows we’re just going to do a
warmed over version of something on all the
items. So I kept pestering him about it and he
said, ‘‘I don’t want to hear any more about it.’’
I said, ‘‘So you agree with my construct?’’ He
said, ‘‘No,’’ and I said, ‘‘Well you haven’t heard
enough, I’ll repeat it.’’ Whereupon he fired me,
absolutely used the word. He said, ‘‘You’re
fired.’’ I said, ‘‘Thank you.’’
After that episode I decided I’d better go
back to Dr. Brown so he heard it fromme before
he heard it from somebody else. And I went in.
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I had to restrain myself; I just said a quiet
‘‘Hello.’’ So he said, ‘‘Alright, do it yourself.’’
That’s where I got into damage limiting. So I
inherited the job, rendered a tentative cut at
it, showed how do it on the basis of marginal
return of each one of these agents and then Sec-
retary Brown gaveme some extra people to help
me do it. We rendered the tentative report and
handed it in to him. I think that took us about
three months.
Bob Sheldon: Were you still at Andrews?
Glenn Kent: No. I’m working for Brown, in
the Pentagon. This took me about three months.
I handed it in to him. Lo and behold three or
four days later, he calls me down there and says,
‘‘I showed this to Mack Murray. He thinks it’s
great. He’s now commissioning a big joint study
and you’re running it.’’ A representation from
each of the services, JCS. I was stunned, but
what can I say.
Bob Sheldon: You were a colonel at the time
or a general?
Glenn Kent: General. So, I finally got that re-
port out. Limiting damage in the United States,
which stands as a monumental effort even to-
day. One bar chart in particular in that report
caught the eye of both Brown and McNamara.
I showed that if we stayed on the 70 percent util-
ity line, 70 percent of the United States would
survive a basic Soviet attack. What we had to
spend total, and within that total, how much
we were going to spend on active defense, civil
defense, on Nike-X, bomber defense, and on
counterforce.
What caught their attention was the mar-
ginal returns, the exchange rates at that point.
To stay on the 70 percent line, if the Soviets
upped the ante, increased the threat, how much
do I have to spend compared to what they spent
to increase the threat? How much do I have to
spend to counter it, on the margin? At the 70
percent line, that is about three to one.
Bob Sheldon:Wehave to spend three times as
much as them?
Glenn Kent: The 90 percent line is more
like five to one, as I recall. And that did it. Be-
cause they wanted to look to the reactive So-
viet threat. There was some gee and hawing
around about it. So I was present when a great
decision was made about the direction this
nation was going.
Brown called me and said, ‘‘McNamara
wants to see your charts again.’’ So, I’m the chart
carrier. I go up there and he looks at that chart
and wants to know if he has the right under-
standing of what the exchange rate is. Three
to one. And he did. And Brown chimes in and
says, ‘‘I’ve had other people look at it and I am
convinced it is three to one, or worse.’’ So
McNamara says, ‘‘Well, in effect this is a vacant
strategy.’’ Vacant. Won’t work. We’re not pre-
pared to outspend the Soviets at three to one.
At 70 percent surviving, you say 70 percent sur-
viving, General, that sounds pretty good. Do
you know what our detractors will say? Only
60 million dead. We’re spending all this money.
What we must do is negotiate an arms control
agreement with the Soviet Union to restrict de-
fenses so that we can constrain the offense. So
that was the genesis of the ABM Treaty of 1972.
Nike-X died along with all the others in
damage limiting. So, I got a lot of flak for that.
Bob Sheldon: Who did you get flak from?
Glenn Kent: I didn’t get flak fromMcNamara.
McNamara bought it lock, stock, and barrel.
That’s why I got flak from other people. The
way they put it, it was the greatest mistake
we ever made in strategic matters, and that is
the ABM Treaty of 1972.
One of my detractors wouldn’t let that
up for years. Every time he’d see me, "There’s
the man that was the genesis of the ABM Treaty,
the worst of our greatest strategic disasters, the
ABM Treaty of 1972. They were giving me more
credit than credit was due about being the archi-
tect. That wasn’t my purpose.
Jim Bexfield: Did they still point the finger
at you during the Star Wars development? The
Strategic Defense Initiative?
Glenn Kent: Oh, yes. That carried over.
On the Star Wars development, I took another
slightly different approach. I didn’t oppose Star
Wars directly. What I did was say, ‘‘Look, you
have to be careful, think this out, because we’re
likely to put in a defense that looks pretty good
against a ragged Soviet offense after our counter
force attack.’’ So, I coined the word, we have
‘‘conditional survivability.’’ Meaning this na-
tion survives if we strike first. The Soviets might
have this same thing. Their nature to survive is
based on strike first, so that destabilizes the idea
of first strike stability. I wrote several reports on
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that and got a lot of flak from all the dedicated
Star Wars people. That was a bad chapter in
our strategic thinking. They never did take on
the issue of first strike survivability directly,
except one analyst. He was pretty clever. He
would suggest that it looked like I was wrong
without ever having said it.
Bob Sheldon: Getting back to the 1965 era,
when Vietnam was heating up, was there com-
petition for defense funding for operations in
Vietnam as opposed to strategic defense?
Glenn Kent: Oh yes. I didn’t really get into
the matter of what the allocations would be, but
there certainly was competition for the dollars.
Jim Bexfield: Was there competition getting
to Harold Brown and McNamara, getting to
speak to them and work with them?
Glenn Kent: Yes. Conversations with both
those gentlemen were exceedingly short. They
were both very capable men with minds that
would run ahead of you, and they were quick
learners and decisive. I recall one episode in
particular. Both Brown andMcNamara had been
briefed on some goings on near Tallinn, the cap-
ital of Estonia. Became known as the Tallinn
Complex. There’s a lot of construction there
and the Tallinn community was not sure what
it was all about. Most of the speculation centered
on it being part of an integrated and complex
ABM system for the Soviet Union. It looked as
though the Soviet Union might be starting on
an ABM system. That was before the Treaty of
1972.
Dr. Brown, who was a man of great fore-
sight, worried about that. So he faxed a letter
for McNamara to sign telling him that even
though we weren’t certain what that was, we
couldn’t afford to wait. We better think about
how we would respond to a Soviet ABM de-
ployment. So McNamara says okay he’d sign
such a letter. He added to that letter. He said,
‘‘Although I’m not convinced, personally, that
this will ever amount to anything, in terms of
an ABM system, nevertheless, we can’t afford
to wait. We must start now and think about
our countermeasures in case they do continue
with an ABM system.’’ So, he sent the letter to
Brown. Brown called me in and said, ‘‘Come
upwith recommendations.’’ In about three weeks
I went to Project Polaris, under Admiral Levering
Smith, and to the Ballistic Missile Office (BMO)
and asked for their recommendations and came
out with six or seven recommendations.
We need more throwaways. We’re going to
have to use decoys and we need more throw-
aways. So fill out the tube in the Polaris subs
and that became the Poseidon Program. The
Navy wants to put on the new missiles. They
aren’t individually targeted, but they spread
out over an area pattern. So we’ll do that. Num-
ber three, upgrade Minuteman, give it more
thrust. Number four, put a post boost, post vehi-
cle on Minuteman that can independently tar-
get RVs. And that was the beginning of MIRV.
Number fivewas starting a technology program
to understand decoys: how to make lightweight
decoys that are credible.
So, I handed it in to Brown. The total of it
didn’t take more than three pages. Of course,
I had some solid people at Aerospace and
RAND and other places suggest what concepts
we should undertake to counter an effective de-
fense. But it’s interesting to note that Brown,
he piddled with it a little bit and sent it to
McNamara. And McNamara within the week
sent back ‘‘OK, RMC’’ on every one of them.
Just think what it takes now to get anything
of that magnitude started. Mission Needs State-
ments and ORDs and other countless mindless
documents.
One thing you can never accuse Brown and
McNamara of being was not decisive and not
incisive.




Glenn Kent: They knew behind it was Admi-
ral Smith of the Polaris Project, saying that’s
what he would do—Polaris. And BMO and
the Aerospace Corporation say, ‘‘Yes, that’s what
we should do to Minuteman.’’ So there was con-
sensus of the community. The document handed
to Dr. Brown was three pages.
That was in the days when people trusted
each other. Brown trusted the judgment of those
people. That’s what they recommend and that’s
what Gen Kent recommends. I’ll recommend it
to McNamara, and McNamara’s the same way.
That Dr. Brown recommends. So, the process
was more about people than about documents
as it is today.
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Bob Sheldon: Let’s go forward to you becom-
ing Deputy Director of Development Plans. Was
that immediately following?
Glenn Kent: You’re right. I left DDR&E and
went to become head of Development Plans at
Andrews.
Jim Bexfield: You were there from 1966 to
1968?
Glenn Kent: Yes. Over at Andrews. That’s
correct. There was a short year in between when
I left DDR&Ebefore Iwent toAndrews. Iworked
for Gen Joseph Holzapple.
Jim Bexfield: What did you do for him?
Glenn Kent: Assistant for Concept Formu-
lation.
Bob Sheldon: Then from Andrews, you went
to take charge of Studies and Analysis. Was that
a natural progression for you?
Glenn Kent: No. That happened under very
peculiar circumstances. Gen McConnell had
just been made Chief. I get a call. I don’t know
if he knows me from Adam. I think it has some-
thing to do with Systems Command. I say to the
guy on his behalf, his exec officer, ‘‘What’s the
subject?’’ Because I figure I better inform Gen
Ferguson before I go see the Chief. His exec of-
ficer calls back in about five minutes and says,
‘‘The subject is, Gen McConnell wants to see
you in his office alone at 0800. Period.’’ ‘‘Yes,
sir. I got it.’’ I don’t know what the subject is.
So, I go over there. I walked in. Gen McConnell
looks at me with his eyes and says, ‘‘Sit down
boy.’’ He started calling me ‘‘boy’’ then and he
never got over it. He says, ‘‘Sit down boy.’’ He
says, ‘‘I’ve been watching you. I need a guy like
you onmy staff. I’m surrounded by yesmen up
here that try to figure out what I want to hear
and not what I should hear. So, I’m putting
you on my staff for that purpose. I want
a guy who thinks hard and thinks clear and
will tell me what I should hear. And if I find
that once you’re on my staff you’re catering
to those three-star general yes men, you’re
fired.’’ Well, that’s quite a charter. He then
added, somewhat parenthetically, ‘‘I’m giving
you Studies and Analysis to run.’’ Well now,
what more could I ask? Here I am empowered
to work directly for the Chief and got Studies
and Analysis to help me think. And I parlayed
that into the next four years, as much as I
could.
Bob Sheldon: When you initially went to
Studies and Analysis, who were your senior
officers reporting to you?
Glenn Kent: They were very capable. Col
Eugene Steffes (later a Maj Gen) was there. I
inherited a bunch of young majors and lieuten-
ant colonels. One I inherited was a lieutenant
colonel by the name of Larry Welch (later Gen).
So I inherited a lot of good people there. I had
a little difficulty when I first arrived. Some of
them began to fret about this hands-on approach
of mine. ‘‘How dare you change my chart!’’
There was a good deal of resistance to that.
They’d been used to just handing it in, and the
General would sign it and that’s it. So, I began
to have a problem on that score. My exec officer,
Col Steffes, a very dedicated young officer,
came to me and said, ‘‘The fact is that you have
unrest among the troops.’’ So I called them in
and said, ‘‘I understand some of you don’t like
my hands-on style. It’s not apt to change. It’ll
probably get worse. If you don’t like it, I’ll give
you a deal you can’t turn down. You can ask
for a transfer out of this organization; you can
leave without any bad report. But if you stick
around, it’s my way.’’ Interesting enough, about
a fourth of the people transferred out. The best
thing that ever happened to me. All those empty
slots. Now I can recruit people again.
So, we had somewhat of an unstable be-
ginning. There was a transportation study. I
was going into the detail of what they’d been
doing with the Army by direction of the JCS.
I couldn’t understand what it was up to. I said,
‘‘Who was going to use it? What’s it for?’’ And
on and on and on. Some of themathwaswrong
by inspection. The interesting thing was the
other General had approved it but hadn’t
signed off on it yet. They said, ‘‘You can’t hold
it up. We have an agreement with the Army;
the Army General signed it and so on.’’ So,
the Army General called me and said, ‘‘I un-
derstand you don’t like that report.’’ I said,
‘‘Right.’’ He says, ‘‘Could I talk to you?’’ He
came over and talked to me and he said, ‘‘You
know, I didn’t like it either, but I was told
that the Air Force liked it.’’ So, he just can-
celled it, much to the chagrin of the people
who worked on it, no doubt. As a matter of
fact, all of them quit. They were part of the
fourth that quit.
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Bob Sheldon: When you first got to Studies
and Analysis, where were your study taskings
coming from?
Glenn Kent: That’s a good question. The way
it worked was Studies and Analysis was fram-
ing up their own study program and getting it
blessed by the Air Staff warden. Shortly after
I arrived there, why I’m handed this thing that
we had to hand to theAir Staffwarden to get ap-
proval of our studies program. And I say, ‘‘I
don’t want that Air Staff warden telling me
what to do.’’ They said, ‘‘Well, it’s in regula-
tion.’’ I said, ‘‘Show me the regulation.’’ They
couldn’t find it. I said, ‘‘Maybe no one in the
Air Staff can find the regulation. Let’s just don’t
go down there and see what happens.’’ Nothing
happened.
So, I tried not to seek approval for what
I was doing. That’s constraining on you. I never
had any problem with that because I always
worked the Chief’s problem, one step ahead of
him. That puts the onus on you to be sure that
you’re supporting the Chief.
Jim Bexfield: How did you stay one step
ahead of him?
Glenn Kent: By attending staff meetings, fig-
uring out these issues and coming back and
holding a meeting and saying, ‘‘This is an issue
that is going to need ventilation. What can we
do?’’ That’s theway to stay one step ahead. You’re
not one step ahead if you wait until he asks.
Jim Bexfield:Can you give us some examples
of those one-step-ahead issues that you studied?
Glenn Kent: One program was the F-15. I
didn’t design it, but we had a heavy influence
through Larry Welch of designing what the
F-15 looked like. I realized too that there was
going to be the issue between why the Navy
developed a new fighter and the Air Force de-
veloped a new fighter. We’ve got to be prepared
to win that argument. It’s things like that. So
we did a lot of work preparing ourselves for
the argument. Sure enough there came a day
when there was a group commissioned by the
Secretary of Defense to look at why two pro-
grams, the Navy’s F-14 and the Air Force’s
F-15 that we carry today, mainly through the
work that I bonded with Larry Welch and his
people.
Bob Sheldon:One of the things that both Gen
Welch and Col Hork Dimon told me is that you
would send some of your officers out to brief
other veryhigh rankingofficers, andyouwouldn’t
go along with them. They were impressed by
that. How did you determine which ones you
would send off like that?
Glenn Kent: Obviously they went through
the grindstone before they went off, but I said,
‘‘You don’t need me around. You’re to defend
yourself. You’re to defend what you’re going
to say. Don’t depend onme. You’re on your own.’’
There was an interesting thing one day
when the Army and the Navy were continually
telling us how vulnerable our Minuteman silos
were to Soviet attack by ICBM. Then it occurred
to me that a more appropriate graph was to plot
Soviet weapons available on the abscissa and
U.S. weapons available on the ordinate. Start
at an inventory point of where we both were
and then there’s a drawdown. These became
the fish hook curves I became known for. So,
there’s a drawdown, but it shows that the So-
viets have to give up RVs to kill RVs. See, the
line comes down steep at first because they at-
tack the submarines in port and so on, but then
it flattens out. This was far more to the point
than just plotting this liability to Minuteman
versus weapons on the abscissa.
Jim Bexfield: You called it a fish hook. Where
does the hook come in?
Glenn Kent: It starts on the point on the up-
per northwest corner of the graph and they
come around like that and they go flat at first
for the Soviet first strike and then steep and then
it goes steep at first for the Minutemen. The
curves look like a fish hook; not exactly, but they
were called the fish hook curve. I figured this
gives us a better representation of what’s going
on. So, I put out the dictum that all people in the
Air Force will use such a plot. Well, there’s al-
ways somebody around that worries not about
the subject of the matter but about, ‘‘He doesn’t
have any authority to tell us how to draw our
graphs out here at SAMSO [Space and Missile
Systems Organization] and so on.’’ So, there’s
noise about it. I figured I’ll show it the Chief,
and the Chief will say that to everyone who will
plot it and that’ll get their attention. So I sched-
uled it in a staff meeting. That’s staying ahead of
the problem, see.
But the different slant is the vulnerability
of Minuteman, and I had a major who gave
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the briefing. Now, the Major was a sleeper. He
looked like a country boy from someplace but
he was one sharp cookie. He gives the briefing.
It has to be short to go to the staff meeting; it
has to be under 10 minutes, or seven minutes
or something like that. He gets through it.
The Chief says, ‘‘Great. That’s an excellent idea
and we all ought to, as the briefing says, we all
ought to plot it that way and not plot it short of
Minuteman going to practically zero.’’
A three-star starts in on the Major. I said
quietly, ‘‘The Major is doing all right defending
the chart.’’ The Chief of Staff, Gen John Ryan,
keeps looking at me and motions me to get in
the act. I ignore him at first. Finally he glares
at me to get in the act. So, I did and made short
shift of the three-star.
Bob Sheldon: Who was the Major?
Glenn Kent: I don’t remember his name. But,
that’s my idea. I’m going to let that Major de-
fend himself as long as he can. I’m not going
to step in there. People asked the Major, ‘‘How
did you do?’’ And he said, ‘‘Nothing but what
Gen Kent didn’t ask.’’ He understood what I
was doing, according to my own dictum, ‘‘You
defend yourself when the enemy appears.’’
Bob Sheldon: You talked earlier about review-
ing the slides that your analysts were producing.
I heard from various folks that they went from
producing one set of slides to get out the door
to producing three generations of slides. Could
you talk about that process?
Glenn Kent: Well, that’s not quite right.
In those days, they weren’t slides; generally,
they were charts. I had a graphics department
that I defended in front of the Chief to the bitter
end so that I didn’t have to stand in long
queues where other people had charts made.
So changing the chart wasn’t a trivial matter.
It meant the graphics department had to erase
the old and maybe start a whole new chart.
They hand-lettered them. Well, I believed that
if we can improve something, we should. Our
product is going to, on the margin anyhow,
be our best. So if there is something we can
do to improve the chart, we will, and don’t
worry about the graphics department. They
get paid for overtime. It was a civilian run
outfit.
Bob Sheldon: They still had a graphics shop
in AFSAAwhen I got there in 1990.
Glenn Kent: Is that right? I defended that
graphics shop until the bitter end. People were
continually trying to just have one graphics shop
for the Pentagon and I convinced two Chiefs
(both Gen McConnell and Gen Ryan), ‘‘No, I
need my full graphics shop.’’
Bob Sheldon: For those people that left, how
did you find new people to backfill? What kind
of characteristics did you look for?
Glenn Kent: My idea of recruitment was,
I would listen to briefings from some other
agency, and if the guy did real well I’d write
his name down. Another more direct recruiting
was to go out to AFIT and give a speech once
a year. They would tell me the name of their
best five graduates. I did a review of the five
and select two. I got some great lieutenants that
way. I recruited them by name. I had a Captain
Dave Fee as my personnel section. A captain!
He could out-maneuver any other personnel
section in the Pentagon. I can’t claim too much
credit. Lt Gen Bob Dixon (later Gen) was head
of Personnel and he called me in and he said,
‘‘Anybody you want within limits.’’ I had it
ready made that if there was an appeal of some-
body, I had a friendly audience, Gen Dixon.
I spent a lot of time recruiting.
For example, Col Jasper Welch (later Maj
Gen) is just graduating from his year at National
Defense University and I realize the catch he is.
Heworked forme twice before and I called Cap-
tain Fee and I said, ‘‘I’ve had my head up and
locked. I should have had my request in for
Col Welch months ago, so I’m a late starter,
but get him.’’ Captain Fee comes back and said,
‘‘He’s already been assignedwith three-star gen-
eral request.’’ I said, ‘‘Well, try and get him.’’ ‘‘It’s
hopeless General.’’ I said, ‘‘Try anyhow. I have to
have something to complain about and say I
don’t get the people I need.’’ If nothing else, we’ll
lay down a marker. I find out that Lt Gen John
Carpenterwas head of Personnel. GenCarpenter
gives my request more license than I thought.
I’m a two-star and he’s assigned to a three. The
three-star knows Welch very well and he’s not
idle about his request form. But by hook and
crook, we out-maneuvered him, and finally in
a pique of anger, Gen Carpenter says, ‘‘I’ve
assigned him to Glenn; I don’t want to hear
any more about the subject.’’ Which was all right
with me but not all right with the three-star.
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Then arose another problem. The Secretary
of the Air Force, John McLucas wants him. So,
I hang in there. It looks like I was bound to
lose. But I write letters to the Secretary saying,
‘‘Obviously we both want him, but I need him
to guide others. So, he is a multiplier working
for me, but not for you. I need him to mentor
other people.’’ And so on.McLucas wouldwrite
back nice letters and about the fourth one he took
the letter andwent down to the Chief, ‘‘Give him
to Glenn. I don’t want any more letters.’’
I spent a lot of time having a colonel work-
ing for me to whom Gen Momyer had decided
to give a wing. Well, I’m not going to stand in
the way of progression like that. Personnel comes
down and explains it to me and by now they
know my name. We have no choice but to send
him toMomyer. I say, ‘‘I don’t want to talk about
that. Of course you’re going to give him to
Momyer, but you’re robbing me blind. I want
to knowwho you’re going to giveme to replace
this colonel.’’ I said, ‘‘Who have you got? I want
a water walker.’’ He says, ‘‘Well, this guy coming
from Vietnam and he’s going to Plans, but you
can’t have him, he’s going to Plans.’’ I said,
‘‘I want him.’’
Dixon is head of Personnel so I have an ace
in the hole with him. And I want him. One of
the guys says, ‘‘How do you know you want
him, General? You’ve never met him.’’ If he’s
so good, I can’t have him, I want him. So they
changed the orders for Col James Ahmann,
and in walked Col Ahmann who later on was
a three-star general. A very capable guy. He
was a calming influence to all those fighter
pilots that worked up there. So I spent a lot
of effort on recruiting people.
Bob Sheldon: During this time, Dr. Brown
had transitioned—
Glenn Kent: Yes, Harold Brown had become
Secretary of the Air Force.
Bob Sheldon: Did you have many encoun-
ters with him when you were in Studies and
Analysis?
Glenn Kent: Yes. Oh yes. There was an in-
teresting thing that took a hold there. He
came down there and the Chief then was Gen
McConnell, and McConnell and Brown got
along famously although they had two totally
different temperaments. Gen McConnell calls
me in. He said, ‘‘The good news is Dr. Brown
is going to be Secretary of the Air Force. The
bad news is he likes you and wants you to work
for him.’’ So, that was alright. Finally they made
a compromise that I was on the staff of Gen
McConnell but that I could work for Dr. Brown,
and that was no bother at all. Matter of fact,
Gen McConnell told me once, ‘‘I keep protesting
against it so he’ll be sure and keep doing it.’’
Jim Bexfield: What are some examples of
things you studied for Dr. Brown?
Glenn Kent: Some of them had to do with
arms control. Generally they weren’t studies
dedicated to Dr. Brown, but Dr. Brown was at
liberty to have me come up to his office and talk
to him. See, that’s all he wanted in the first
place, and he never abused that. So, I worked
for GenMcConnell and Brown. I had no choice.
If Brown calls, you go. It never bothered
McConnell a bit. McConnell passed himself off
as a barefoot boy from Arkansas. He was the
wiliest general I ever met. He thought about
three moves ahead.
Jim Bexfield: Is there an example of that?
Glenn Kent: I could give you one example
of how McConnell operated. He operated in
strange ways, but he makes a move and he
knows what he’s doing. Some people from OSD,
I won’t name them, went to SAC with malice of
forethought to review the SIOP. They came back
with a scathing report about the Joint Strategic
Planning staff and their efforts in developing
the SIOP at Omaha. They had a list of specifica-
tions of things that they’d found were grossly
wrong and handed it to McNamara. McNamara
called Brown andMcConnell in and said, ‘‘I have
no choice.’’ And they made recommendations
that this whole affair be referred to a Blue Ribbon
committee to look at.
But McConnell, he sees the slippery slope.
That to form a Blue Ribbon committee, it’s un-
der the control of Alain Enthoven, Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense for Systems Analysis. And the
real thing up for grabs here is not to revise the
style, but they wanted the planning to be done
by PA&E. McConnell sees this and he called
me in. He said, ‘‘I just returned from a meeting
with McNamara and Brown on this matter,
and McNamara said I have no choice but to
form this Blue Ribbon committee.’’ But he says,
‘‘You know Glenn, that’s a slippery slope. And
I pulled the one ace I had in the hole. You.
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McNamara likes you.’’ He said, ‘‘Let’s give it
to Gen Kent before we form this Blue Ribbon
committee.’’ Now he said, ‘‘Glenn, boy, Secre-
tary Brown is going to call you up there and
say ‘No whitewash.’ and you nod and say, ‘Ab-
solutely not.’ Glenn, the Air Force ain’t wrong
and don’t you forget it.’’ (Laughter)
So, that’s exactly what happened. I go up
there and I was commissioned to look at it. By
now I had realized that it’s better to attack than
to defend. I shall not defend what the JSTPS
[Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff] is doing
but attack the critique by Enthoven and com-
pany. They had one item in there, the amount
of effort they’re putting on the Tallinn System
is ridiculous. They used the word ridiculous.
R-I-D-I.they spelled it correctly. So I put some
analysts on this. What is the proper attack? Let’s
get a handle on the proper attack on the Tallinn
System and you could make a good mathemat-
ical construct. You do defense suppression so
that the rest of the armies get through. You take
them off of the tactical primary targets and your
goal. Yourmeasure ofmerit is the primary target,
but you can optimize the amount for primary tar-
gets by how much you put on defensive pres-
sures of the Tallinn System.
I got to SAC and showed them this analysis.
They’re out there, but they don’t see the prob-
lem that McConnell sees. The slippery slope
problem. That they’ll lose the JSTPS of Omaha.
They don’t see that, so I have to go to great
lengths. The three-star general out there said,
‘‘I don’t agree with that.’’ And I said, ‘‘Why
don’t you argue that out with Gen McConnell.
I’ll get him on the phone.’’ And I did and he told
that three-star out there in Omaha in no un-
certain terms that he knew exactly what he was
doing and so on.
We don’t know the effectiveness of the single-
shot probability of each one of these complexes
at the Tallinn System. We don’t know if you get
one optimum and it’s two-tenths and the other
optimum is at eight-tenths and so on. The more
effective it is, the more defensive suppression is
appropriate. If it’s at eight-tenths, the appropri-
ate amount to put on there to maximize accord-
ing to our mathematical constructs was just a
little more effort than SAC was putting on it.
So I go to Omaha and I said, ‘‘Giveme a hint
of what you say the factor of this system is.’’
‘‘We don’t know.’’ ‘‘Give me a hint. You’ve got
some direction surely on this business from an
NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] or some-
thing.’’ Well, they’re worthless. They handed
them in and it just shows you how it pays to
be lucky. There I spot the words, see how they
waffle it from the NIE. We judge this between
20 and 80 percent. Eureka. I can argue that you
should plan for the worst case. Maximize the
mins. I rode to glory on that.
So, I show this to Brown and McConnell
and they hold a meeting with Enthoven and
his people. So, Dr. Brown, the Secretary of the
Air Force, and Gen McConnell in there and I
open up by saying, ‘‘You have to plan in the
face of uncertainty. The people at Omaha can’t
tell a Minuteman silo to survive on the other
hand. It has to be concrete decision. Now SAC
has staked out their position and I think they’re
putting about five RVs on this complex. On dif-
ferent elements of the complex, there were sev-
eral different elements so, but five sticks in my
mind. There’s five on each element of the com-
plex. And you have said this is ridiculous. I
have an analysis here that shows that it’s right
on the mark. But first we have to see before I
open up on that, that we understand the theory
of the Min-Max or the Max-Min.’’ Enthoven
thought he understood it. I said, ‘‘Just in case
you don’t, I’ll recite it again.’’ This is just to nail
it down. So, I said the following, ‘‘SAC has
picked the number five. What is your number?
Now your number that you repeat has got to
be one or zero or two because if it’s four, you
can’t say that SAC is ridiculous. So you boxed
yourself in. Your numbers are two, one, or zero.
What is it?’’ They said, ‘‘We’re not going to get
in the numbers game with you.’’ I said, ‘‘Well,
what do you mean? You got in the numbers
game. You said SAC numbers are too high and
you won’t even offer what your number is.
Now, there’s something wrong here.’’ At which
point, Dr. Brown said, ‘‘Gen Kent, I don’t think
we need to conduct this meeting in such a con-
frontational way.’’ (Laughter) This is why I say
Gen McConnell is always one move ahead. He
says, ‘‘That’s right General. I don’t like your at-
titude about this, the way you’re treating these
people. You’re dismissed.’’
So, I leave the room. An hour later, he calls
me up there and he said, ‘‘I had to get you out
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of there. I didn’t want the argument about what
the numberwas, but the argument Iwantedwas
that they had none. That they wouldn’t offer
any.’’ And I said to Brown, ‘‘If they go ahead
with this, I’m going to make this known to ev-
erybody that will listen.’’ I said, ‘‘The game is
over, we win.’’ (Laughter). So McConnell is one
wily customer.
Jim Bexfield: Did you have many dealings
with Alain Enthoven?
Glenn Kent: Many. Some of them good and
fruitful. Some of them not so good. We were
on opposite sides or different sides. I had deal-
ings with Alain when I was up in DDR&E and
when I had Studies and Analysis. I actually
liked Alain, although we were at loggerheads
on many different issues. He was smart. I al-
ways remember one time up there, he was frus-
trated with me and he said, ‘‘I don’t know how
to cope with you. You got all these majors and
lieutenant colonels working for you. You tell
them what the answer is and they say, ‘Yes’
and try to show you’re right.’’ I looked at him
said, ‘‘My goodness, is there another way?’’
(Laughter)
Bob Sheldon: Did you notice a change from
Johnson to Nixon in 1969?
Glenn Kent: No, I didn’t.
Jim Bexfield:Did the politics of Brown taking
over as Secretary of the Air Force float down
to your level?
Glenn Kent: No. I still kept in touch with
Brown even when he became Secretary of De-
fense. It was never very formal but he would
call me and ask me to give him a paper on such
and such and I would gladly do it.
Jim Bexfield: Sometime around 1971, Clayton
Thomas moved in. You used to have the Stud-
ies and Analysis, and then AFGOA (Air Force
Operations Analysis) became part of Studies
and Analysis. Can you talk about that transi-
tion?
Glenn Kent: Some other person, ‘not me.’
That’s important. ‘Not me.’ And ‘not my peo-
ple.’ They worried about why two groups were
reporting to the Chief for analysis. I was willing
to let sleeping dogs lie but it was coming to a
head, so I commissioned a lieutenant colonel
who worked up there in AFGOA. I got in touch
with him and said, ‘‘Figure out a way to make
this transition go as smooth as possible and
not be disruptive.’’ So, we came upwith the idea
that we would just merge and I would hire each
one of those guys in AFGOA. There were half
a dozen of them. I gave Clayton Thomas the
job of Chief Scientist as I recall.
Jim Bexfield: You had a Rick Camp. I’ve for-
gotten who the leader was. He was a big guy.
Glenn Kent: Yes. I made him my Assistant
Deputy. My stance was, they can come if they
want to. If they don’t want to come work for
me, okay. But there’s a job waiting for them
down there. A responsible job, not just a square
peg job. I expect them to do good work. About
three or four of them accepted, Clayton Thomas
being one of them.
Jim Bexfield: I think it was closer to five or
six.
Glenn Kent: Yes. So we made the transition
smoothly. Interestingly enough, I had one colo-
nel in a senior position that kept fighting that
problem. He’d come to me and said, ‘‘You don’t
have to do that. You don’t have to give them
good jobs down here.’’ I said, ‘‘I know I don’t
but I said I would. So that’s it.’’ He kept pester-
ing me about that and I fired him because he
was screwing it up. He was making a bad deal.
He was in favor of inviting Air Force officers,
but didn’t want to work for civilians.
Jim Bexfield: As I recall, you had Gus Tra-
pold.
Glenn Kent: Yes, it wasn’t Gus.
Jim Bexfield:Wasn’t he one of your colonels?
Glenn Kent: Yes, Gus was always loyal. Gus
was my Deputy. This was another colonel.
Jim Bexfield: What kind of interactions did
you have with Clayton Thomas?
Glenn Kent: Very good. He spent more of
his time interacting with the people, the other
analysts. Jasper Welch and Clayton got along
quite well. They were both there at the same
time. They made it work. I told Jasper, ‘‘You’re
both to mentor people and I hope you can be
fit to do it together.’’ Jasper said, ‘‘Amen.’’ And
so did Clayton. That was a good move because
we got Clayton. That helped it in the long run
and it helped to no end.
Gen Ryan called me in when he heard of
this proposition that I’d given them good jobs
down there. He said, ‘‘You don’t have to do
that.’’ I said, ‘‘I know. But I’m doing it for the
good of the Air Force.’’ He said, ‘‘Okay. Done.’’
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Because the Personnel and the Manpower peo-
ple thought they had to get in the act.
Jim Bexfield: Another person’s name was
Zimmerman.
Glenn Kent: Carroll Zimmerman. Right. He
stayed in my office for awhile and gracefully
retired.
Jim Bexfield: Sometime during your four
years at Studies and Analysis, you went to
MORS or you sent a bunch of people to MORS.
Do you remember early encounters with the
Military Operations Research Society while you
were there?
Glenn Kent: Not anything specific. I sup-
ported MORS. I was one of the MORS sponsors.
Jim Bexfield:With Jasper Welch, he had a lit-
tle side office right next to yours and he was
doing some special papers for the Congress?
Do you recall that whole activity?
Glenn Kent: Yes, that started with Black Fri-
day. On one Friday, Senator Stennis took out of
the Armed Forces Bill the money for AWACS,
for the full-scale development, for the last lot
for the C-5, and the F-15. Those are the big three.
It culminated because of our effort on AWACS.
Earlier, Senator Stennis, Chairman of the Armed
Services committee, had asked for a justification
for the AWACS because Senator Proxmire had
an amendment to his bill. Proxmire was con-
tinually putting in amendments to the Armed
Forces Bill and deleting things. He put one in
on AWACS. It was going to be debated on the
floor of the Senate. So, he was relying on Gold-
water to carry the day. Goldwater, in turn was
relying on the Air Force to give him a paper
on it. Senator Goldwater convinced Stennis to
leave it in and he would defend it on the floor
of the Senate. So, Goldwater requested some
support from the Air Force. Whatever docu-
ment they had to give to Goldwater to help
him counter Proxmire was delivered on the
floor of the Senate to Goldwater 10minutes after
Proxmire finished. Stennis manipulated things
so there wasn’t a vote taken on AWACS at the
time. He postponed it. But of course Goldwater
and Stennis are furious at the Air Force. Where-
upon Goldwater sent a stinging message in
bold, cursive handwriting to Ryan that said,
‘‘Get your act together. How can I support you
with support like this from the Air Staff? L&L
means Late and Lousy. (L&L is supposed to
stand for Air Force Legislative Liaison).’’ Signed
Goldwater. Oh, it was a stinging, written out in
cursive handwriting on a 5 x 7 sheet delivered
in person by a courier, hand delivered to the
Chief of the Staff, Gen Ryan.
This got Gen Ryan’s attention. He convenes
a meeting. It’s 4:00 in the afternoon on Friday.
He is Black Jack Ryan at his best, and the meet-
ing is very short. He said to certain people at
the meeting, ‘‘You, you, you, and you assorted
three-star generals and myself and the General
who was head of L&L appear at 8:00 tomorrow
morning in this office. I have to leave for Vietnam
at about 10:00, but come prepared to tell me how
we’re going to fix this.’’
So, we all appeared at 8:00 the next morn-
ing. Gen Ryan sits at the head of the table. It’s
a long, thin table. I sit as far down on the left
as possible. I had done a careful study and
found out that you’re least noticeable at that
spot. (Laughter).
The three-stars say something and Black
Jack is still Black Jack Ryan, and Ryan is in a
real violent mood. He’d interrupt them and tell
them, ‘‘That’s stupider than the last thing you
said. Tell me how we’re going to fix this.’’ And
these guys are getting it every time they opened
their mouth, it’s rammed right back down their
throats. He kept coming back to how we’re go-
ing to fix this. Suddenly, Ryan points his finger
at me and he says, ‘‘You! You usually talk too
much. I didn’t invite you up here to try and sit
this out. What’ve you got to say?’’ I looked at
him. He said, ‘‘Stand up and say something.’’
So, I did. I let it rip. I’d been rehearsingwhat
I was going to say until midnight. I said, ‘‘The
reason I haven’t joined in the conversation so
far, Gen Ryan, is because it’s about how to band
aid a fatally flawed system. And I want no part
in it.We’ve got to have peoplewho are proactive
on this subject and not reactive and wait until
the crisis appears before they start thinking.
I’m not against the major who wrote that paper
beginning at 5:00 Thursday evening until 8:00
the next morning. I’m against the system that
puts a major like that in that flaw. The major
was a PEM (Program Element Monitor). He
knows they’re going about to build AWACS
and knows all about the financing and program-
ming of AWACS, but he doesn’t know why the
AWACS is there in the first place. That’s an
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operator’s job, it’s not for technical people.
You’ve got to form a group of your smartest col-
onels, headed by somebody who will be ac-
countable for it. They would be proactive to
this Congress. When a request comes in, they
start working on it exactly seven and a half
minutes after it arrives in the high rent district.’’
That’s because the request from Goldwater had
stayed five hours in Ryan’s office. Time wasted.
No value added.
Ryan said, ‘‘How do you get seven and
a half minutes?’’ I said, ‘‘I’ve tried it, Sir. If you
walk briskly, you can walk from your office to
any place in the Pentagon in seven and a half
minutes.’’ (Laughter) About that time, he had
had enough. I fared better than the others. He
didn’t say I was stupid.
Ryan abruptly ended the meeting and de-
parted for Andrews to go to Vietnam. At the
staff meeting Monday morning, Ryan is gone
and the deputy, Gen J. C. Myer (the ace in
WWII), the Vice Chief, holds the staff meeting.
There’s some perfunctory things said. After
the staff meeting, I depart and he sends the ex-
ecutive officer paddling down the hall and he
yells, ‘‘The General wants to see you.’’ So Gen
Myer opens up. And Gen Myer always had to
analyze people, and he did it very well. He said,
‘‘You continually amaze me. I thought, ‘There
sits that guy thinking he can sit this out down
there on the left and Gen Ryan is going to blow
his cover. But I realized now you weren’t sitting
it out. You were waiting to be called. You were
sitting there spring-loaded. You must have prac-
ticed that speech you gave until midnight.’’
I said, ‘‘No, I’m a slow learner, General. It
took ‘til two in the morning.’’ He said, ‘‘Well,
I was impressed. You were right on. We’ve got
to totally revamp the way we support these
systems. We can’t let the technology people do
it. It’s got to come from the operators.’’ I made
that point. He said, ‘‘Gen Ryan called me from
Hickam Sunday. He thought about this all the
way to Hawaii and he says you’re right. Now
what were your reckless words, General? Form
a group, put some general officer in charge and
make him accountable. Guess what. You get
to do that.’’ I said, ‘‘Okay.’’ Whereupon he said,
‘‘You ought to protest a little bit because here
you are about to be put in a place where the
three-stars let it fall through the cracks and
throw you in the breach. You ought to protest.’’
I said, ‘‘Well, General. I’ll protest all you want
to; I got work to do though.’’ So I got the job.
I departed there, went back to my office. I
had expected that to happen and wanted it
to happen.
He said, ‘‘Be gone.’’ So, I went back and
within an hour I formed a central integrating
group of people to work for me. I had a little
meeting with Jasper Welch, Col Ahmann, and
other trusted agents. I opened up by saying,
‘‘Guess what? I’ve been able to get a new charter
onwhich, if we go for broke, it’s going to bewith
great visibility. And Jasper, you’re in charge.’’
Later, I said to JC Meyer, ‘‘Can I draw on people
other than that work for me? I want one or two
others.’’ And I had them already in my mind.
So, I formed a group and had peoplewhoworked
for me plus one. Ahead of the group was Jasper
Welch. Very prominent in the group was Col
Larry Welch [later AF Chief of Staff], Col James
Ahmann [later Lt Gen], Col James Callaghan
[later Lt Gen], and Col Richard Boverie [later
Maj Gen]. All these people that I put on this
central integrated group became generals later,
except one and he deferred a promotion to colo-
nel to get out of the Air Force and run his dad’s
business. He had a chance.
The proximate cause was to get AWACS
back in the bill. See it’s been deleted from the
bill. Stennis, to avoid embarrassment by Prox-
mire deletes it himself. It preempts the whole
affair. Incidentally, Stennis not only deleted
AWACS, but the last buy of the C-5 and the FX
which became the F-15. You know, that was
a bad day.
So, we hold a meeting about the advocacy
of AWACS. AWACS started out to be a Fire
Warning and Control System for Continental
Air Defense—defense against Soviet bombers.
But it was losing its traction because people were
arguing as Proxmire did, why defend against
the least likely threat, because the Soviets in
the meantime have gotten ICBMs. We tried to
make an argument. It turned out to be a weak
argument.We’ll defend against what we can de-
fend against. But that argument doesn’t have
much traction. So, the meeting held forth for
an hour and I announced, tomorrow morning
at 8:00 come prepared to give something new
about AWACS. The analyses from the past
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aren’t going to carry the day. So, the next morn-
ing they convened and after a little bit, there was
a sleepy-eyed lieutenant colonel sitting there by
the name of Larry Welch who said, ‘‘The eyes
and ears of commanders around the world.’’ I
said, ‘‘Find a friend.’’
So, the advocate of AWACS then has got
to be Gen Momyer at TAC and not General X
out of Air Defense Command. I went to Gen
Ryan and GenMeyer that day and told him that
we had the ship, and that he had to call Gen
Momyer and tell him of the ship so that Momyer
would get on board. I said, ‘‘We’ve got to have
an operator with the stature of Momyer to lay
it on the line about AWACS. Eyes and ears
of commanders around the world.’’ And that
was done. Momyer was a little reluctant at first,
but we wrote the papers for him and he caught
on readily and was enthusiastic about it.
So, we got AWACS back on the bill in about
two weeks. And we got the last lot of the C-5s
and the F-15s or the FX back in about two and
a half weeks, for which I got credit.
We started in and we maxed the course.
That central integrating group did amazingly
well. Within a week, we had those three items
restored. Then Gen Ryan said, ‘‘It worked so
well, I’m going to give you 12 major programs.’’
I said, ‘‘General, you’re killing the goose. Twelve
for this special treatment, we’ll be overloaded.
I’ll take eight but not all.’’ So, he then named
10 and we wrote the advocacy papers for the
major weapons of the Air Force and then it
worked out magically. It worked like magic.
Jasper and all those people worked closely with
L&L, anticipated problems and prepared the pa-
pers ahead of time. L&L was anxious for me to
succeed because, believe me, they are on the
hot seat on that. It was a far cry from a major be-
ing given the problem at 5:00 at night. It worked
out famously and we got great kudos for all that.
Bob Sheldon: Did you get back in Gold-
water’s good graces after that?
Glenn Kent: Oh, absolutely. Goldwater
wrote a glowing letter to Ryan that ‘‘Your man
Kent has changed night into day. I’m getting
great support.’’
Bob Sheldon:Did you get the seven and a half
minute response time?
Glenn Kent: By now it doesn’t necessarily go
through the Chief. The request comes in to the
legislative liaison guy and he goes directly to
me and we anticipate these problems. We don’t
wait until the crises to start thinking and writing
about it.
The extent that I was to review all the testi-
mony ahead of time by any of the warlords be-
fore they went and testified to Congress. Ryan
made that stick in spades. Not that I had veto
power, but if I had anything in there that wor-
ried me, I’d go to Ryan and tell him and Ryan
would decide which way to go. He made it
stick, andwe nevermissed a lick.Wewere lucky
that it’s all it could be. And we were proactive
in the business. We anticipated if it was going
to be an issue. In general, we had to be aware
of what Proxmire was up to, which wewere able
to do. And be sure that we could rebut any anal-
ysis that his people turned out.
See, Senator Proxmire was a formidable
opponent over there. He and Ted Kennedy
and some other senators had bonded together
and formed a group of analysts who were pretty
good, so we had our work cut out for us.
One thing I remember in particular, they
had a study that showed we ought to use more
of the CRAF, the CRAF being the Civil Reserve
Air Fleet. How do you rebut that? Not directly.
What you do is talk about an innovative deploy-
ment of amechanized division and you haul the
outside cargo in a C-5, the oversize in the C-141
and all other cargo and personnel in the CRAF.
To have an integrated deployment, we need a
few more C-5s than we’re ordering. So, the more
CRAF you have, the more C-5s you have to keep
up. See? So we turned the argument around
and submitted it to Goldwater and he puts it
into the Congressional Record and they quit. It
was things like that, because we were able to
take their analysis and generally turn it around
some way or another.
Jasper was a genius at figuring things like
that out. I don’t know if he figured that one
out but he was a genius at computer program-
ming. He was way ahead of his time.
Jim Bexfield: He was very bright.
Glenn Kent: Jasper had some people work-
ing for him. For example, I’m on a group down
there to look at how we base our ICBMs, how
we base our strategic RVs. For openers, I said
I checked with the Chief, and in the long run
we ought to go toward the idea that up to one
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half are put in subs at sea. And the other half
is divided somewhat evenly between bombers
on alert and ICBMs. But before, Mr. Navy, it
seems as though you’ve staked out positions
and put them all at sea, and for that we have
to really examine their vulnerability at sea. The
Navy was foolish enough to take the bait and
not agree to the 50 percent thing from the Air
Force.
The guy that ran that group, Lt Gen Arthur
Oberbeck of the Army, was mightily impressed
by that. He said to the Navy, over and over, you
ought to take this thing and run. The Navy gave
a briefing about the ballistic missile submarine.
They had some factor and so on, and the Soviet
subs never made engagement.
Jasper took the same data and did it sto-
chastically, not by expected value, and took
the factors that were in the Navy report. That’s
important. He gave a briefing down there to
that group. I introduced him. After Jasper got
through, I said, ‘‘What’s the problem, Admiral?
You only lose a sub every two weeks.’’ (Laughter)
The Navy adopted that technique, got the
computer program from Jasper and used it.
They didn’t come formally to the Air Force,
but they came to Jasper. He was able to put that
program together in three days and come down
there and brief them. And nobody could touch
him. He knew the page number and the para-
graph number for every one of those factors
and the only difference was stochastic.
Jim Bexfield: What’s your favorite Larry
Welch story?
Glenn Kent: My favorite Larry Welch story
is when I was at Systems Command. The oper-
ators, every time they took too long shaving in
the morning, it put a new requirement on the
F-15. It had to havemore thrust-to-weight, a cer-
tain flight regime, sustained turn rate, more
payload, more range. So they’re defining an air-
craft that can’t be built. It’s not an executable
program. I tell Gen James Ferguson, Commander
of Air Force Systems Command, they’re just
going to make this a disaster. I tried to stamp
out these stupid requirements, but every time
I stamped one out, another one arose. It takes
me two weeks to a month to knock one out. It
takes them only five minutes to put in a new
one. I’m behind the power curve here. I said,
"Larry, I want to just let them run rampant and
then you, at the right time, have an agonizing
reappraisal of this. You and the head of TAC—
go out there to Kirtland and Wright Field and
define what these ‘‘requirements’’ are." He said,
‘‘Okay.’’
In the meantime I leave and go to Studies
and Analysis. When I get to Studies and Anal-
ysis, I tell LarryWelch, ‘‘If we go do this, there’s
going to be an agonizing reappraisal of this
someday and gear yourself for it.’’ So he became
very familiar with the technical carpet plot from
Wright Field. I get a call from Gen Ferguson.
He says, ‘‘The time has come. I have two slots
on that group out there. This is a group of colo-
nels. I’ll give you one. You told me that you have
this water walker over there that you’d like to
have one of the slots. I’ll give them to you. Give
me your names.’’ So, I say, ‘‘Lt Col LarryWelch.’’
He said, ‘‘What? These are colonels. I’m not go-
ing to waste my slot on a lieutenant colonel.’’
I said, ‘‘Come on, General. He doesn’t know.
He’s oblivious to rank. Rank doesn’t mean any-
thing here.’’ So, Ferguson said, ‘‘Alright, but be-
fore I waste my slot on a man, I want to see this
water walker.’’
I sent LarryWelch over to see Gen Ferguson.
The minute Larry leaves Ferguson’s office,
Ferguson calls me and said, ‘‘He’s our boy.’’
So, Larry went toWright Field on this agonizing
reappraisal and dominated the sea. He had both
studies as carte blanche and had Tac Avenger
to get some idea what a certain attribute did
or did not carry to the side. So, he was able to
dominate the scene and did an absolutely out-
standing job of defining the F-15. Not design-
ing, but defining the main characteristics of
the F-15. He had Tac Avenger and when it came
to that issue of shooting the F-14 or the F-15, the
Navy tried to present it as if we should start a
new program. I tried as best I could and it was
fairly successful, passing it off that we already
had a program.We’d just barely had a program.
And it was through my doing that we had a
semblance of a program in Wright Field. So, it
wasn’t adding a program. It was choosing be-
tween the two.
Finally, we went on with this for about
a week. The Navy in the meantime had released
a press thing to the Washington Post that the
world had a fighter, the F-14, why do we need
another one? Had some guy from CNA come
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in and give a briefing that compared the two air-
craft. I had gotten my hands on that briefing
and showed it to Larry Welch. I said, ‘‘Can
you tear it apart?’’ He came back about two
hours later and said, ‘‘It’s a slam dunk.’’ Well,
he may not have used those words. Something
like, ‘‘No problem, no sweat.’’
He went before this group. I opened it up,
but I had a slightly different tactic. I said, ‘‘You
know, Admiral, I’ve been wrong. We shouldn’t
have two programs, we should have ours. So
the choice is whether you buy ours or not. Not
whether we buy yours. And I have a briefing
here that can put tears in your eyes on that
matter. There are approaches to this that are
far, far superior to yours.’’ And after Larry gave
that briefing before this committee, the Admiral
completely changed his mind; he saw the merit
of two programs. I didn’t want to try to get the
Navy in it anyhow.
So, Larry had a lot to do with the advocacy
of the F-15 and understanding and defining it.
He alone defined the F-15, because by all ac-
counts, nobody else had done their homework
before they appeared out there in Wright Field
like Larry had.
Jim Bexfield: Can you say something about
Brig Gen Leon Goodson, later Commander of
Air Force Center for Studies and Analyses? He
was a major when he worked for you.
Glenn Kent: Leon was doing some work
there, this had to do with the central front. It
didn’t occur all in one time, but through a pe-
riod of osmosis, we came to the idea that we
would take the major mission area for the air-
craft. Air Force has two missions, one of them
is to keep Red-delivered ordinance off of Blue
troops and the other is to put Blue-delivered
ordinance on Red troops. And we’ll look at the
difference. There’s several ways we can use air-
craft. We can attack the enemy’s airfields, we
can sweep over the battlefield, we can defend
our own airfields, and so on. So, it’s a duel be-
tween two airports—the major mission area is
anchored to the ground. Now, what is the opti-
mum allocation of aircraft, day by day, to maxi-
mize that at the end of 15 days.
Leon, Scott Meyer, and Lou Finch worked
on that. After about nine months, I came in
and said, ‘‘We’re not making any progress.’’
So, I gave them a lecture, ‘‘You’ll not get a bad
ER (Effectiveness Report) from me if you don’t
succeed. But, you’ll get a bad ER if you don’t
try.’’
Another time I told Leon, ‘‘You keep want-
ing to go back to the operational Air Force. I tell
you what. The day when you are on top of this
problem, you can go.’’ (Laughter) But after a year
and a half, they had a masterpiece, which stood
us in great stead. It’s called Saber Grand. We
taught the computer how to play chess and the
computer could finally play chess better than
anybody else. It had a tremendous effect on the
Air Force. I briefed it to Gen Ryan one day.
He thought it was great. He said, ‘‘We could
put in different options at modernizing and
seewhich onemoved the pipper better than that
gradient of ‘Red minus Blue’ and ‘Blue minus
Red.’’’ See, we could put a gradient with lines
on there, lines equal difference or straight lines
out radially, and see which one moves the pip-
per more.
GenMomyer called me, and whenMomyer
was angry at you, his voice got whiney and he
raised his pitch. And he’s at his worst. He said,
‘‘I just came from the Chief’s office, he told me
about the study you had.’’ I said, ‘‘Yes, sir.’’ He
said, ‘‘I thought you would have showed it to
me first, Glenn.’’ I said, ‘‘When do you want
to see it.’’ ‘‘Tomorrow morning, 9:00, my office,
promptly.’’ I go to Maj Goodson and say, ‘‘I
can’t go, but I’m sending Larry Welch and Col
Ahmann to fly cover for you.’’ Momyer knows
both those men. So, they went down there and
I wait and they came back and said, ‘‘He was
pretty cranky at first, but he warmed up at the
last.’’ About three days later, Momyer called
me and said, ‘‘Glenn, I think we’ve got some-
thing here.’’ Notice, ‘‘we’’ got something here.
‘‘I’d like to work with your boys on this. Could
you send them down again?’’ I said, ‘‘When?’’
He said, ‘‘Tomorrow morning, 9:00.’’
They went down there and as a result of
thatMomyer said, ‘‘I want you to hand that over
to my people.’’ I said, ‘‘It’s too complicated. You
can have some kind of control over Goodson.’’
So, Momyer took Goodson around the world.
Why? Because it showed that the best alloca-
tion was what Momyer had been preaching.
You have to defeat the enemy first—then the
Air Force is first. It made it in spades and that’s
why Momyer bought into it. Then he used it as
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a training aid for his operators to see what differ-
ent allocations of forces meant and how you’d
do badly if you didn’t pay attention to destroy-
ing the enemy first. So, I obeyed Momyer’s
doctrine and Momyer essentially adopted that
and adopted Leon. He took Leon around the
world and Leonwas at his disposal. Leonmade
many trips down to the TAC staff at the direc-
tion of Momyer.
Bob Sheldon: How did the quantity versus
quality argument play into the buy of the F-16?
Glenn Kent: The F-16, the lightweight fighter,
was advertised as 80 percent of the capability
of the F-15 and 75 percent of the cost. But that’s
a pretty narrow cost effective thing. Not enough
to grab the minds of men. I thought about
Lanchester where he says, ‘‘Quantity has a qual-
ity all of its own.’’ So, I put together a very quick
analysis based on the parity of forces. It had to
do with the ratio of Blue to Red squared times
gamma over lambda. The quality. And based
on that, its quantity changes creates this square.
I went up there and sold that to Gen J.C. Meyer.
He already had a warm fuzzy feeling about
Lanchester because we used that argument
against Enthoven.
So, I didn’t start from scratch on that. But
JC Meyer said, ‘‘Okay. You got it. But I’m not
going to be out in front on this.’’ The lightweight
fighter people had poisoned the well with Gen
Meyer because tangled up in their briefing on
it was always this idea that no one understands
air-to-air combat except we few fighter pilots.
That didn’t set well with JC Meyer who was
a leading ace on the Central Front in WWII.
So, it was sold on the basis of the trade be-
tween quantity and quality goes as a square of
the quantity. As I said, I didn’t start from scratch
on that argument because we’d used it earlier
to refute Enthoven about the quality on the Cen-
tral Front.
Bob Sheldon:When I interviewed Seth Bonder,
he mentioned that you contracted him to go
TDY to Germany to interview some Soviet de-
fectors who’d been analysts.
Glenn Kent: That’s right. Seth is correct. I
don’t recall any details of the report that he
made as a result of that. I don’t know what was
in it, but it certainly can’t be classified now. It
was a good report because Seth became one of
my favorites then, as a result of that.
Jim Bexfield: You spent four years from 1968
to 1972 as the head of Air Force Studies and
Analysis, and then you were replaced by Maj
Gen Robert Lukeman. Did you have any say
in who replaced you?
Glenn Kent: I was asked to head the
Weapons System Evaluation Group (WSEG)
by Johnny Foster and it was a three-star slot,
so it was hard to turn down. Bob Lukeman is
a very smart guy. He’s a very good analyst
and he’s a very capable guy. I think he doesn’t
have that failing now—Bob doesn’t tolerate
fools gladly. And it was hard to work for him.
I didn’t work for him; he worked for me, but
I didn’t have any problems with Bob.
I was about at the end of my tour in the Air
Force after 32 years and the job at WSEG came
open. It was a joint organization that rotated;
the head of WSEG rotated among the Army,
Navy, Air Force. And the Navy man is about
to retire so they gave me the job. As a matter
of fact, the head of WSEG reports to two people:
the chairman of the JCS and the DDR&E, which
now works for the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition (USDA). Johnny Foster requested
me so the Air Force conceded and I became head
of WSEG.
Bob Sheldon: He knew your track record?
Glenn Kent: Oh yes, I knew Johnny very
well. When I was at Systems Command, we
couldn’t get the laser-guided bomb to work.
The bomb itself might work, but we couldn’t
get the designation down. We didn’t have the
designator stabilized, and it would break lock,
it would jitter a little bit.
Johnny Foster wanted to show that the tech-
nology could help with the war in Vietnam. So,
he called me in and said, ‘‘I’m going to threaten
the Air Force to take this over unless they let
you run it. But I don’t want to run it. I want
you to run it. This is just to get their attention.’’
And so that happened.
I went to Eglin Air Force Base, andmet with
a guy from Texas Instruments who was a con-
tractor and didn’t make one suggestion because
the turnaround time was enormous. They want
to fix something and send it back to Dallas and
a week or so later it would come back. Well,
that’s ridiculous. We ought to have a machine
shop at Eglin and have a better turnaround time.
The guy who was the contractor came in with
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a guy by the name of Lockhart, a big burly
Texan. And he listened to his subordinate tell
me how they couldn’t have a machine shop
and he suddenly looked at me and said, ‘‘Get
your hat, General, we’ll go out and rent a ma-
chine shop.’’ They’re going to bring their own
machinist in but they want the basics of a ma-
chine shop.
Partly because of that, but not mainly, we
just started having good luck. Everything, in-
stead of breaking or not working, suddenly be-
gan to work. So, after not a very long time at all,
we got it so that we could reliably designate a
target with a laser beam and get the guided bomb
to guide on it. I went to Johnny and said, ‘‘I think
the time has come to ship it over to Vietnam.’’ So
they did, with a contractor team in tow. The rest
is history. The first time they used it they drop-
ped the famous bridge. And Johnny had a warm
and reassured feeling for me from that and other
items. My contribution there was just luck.
Bob Sheldon: During your tenure at WSEG,
what other issues did you tackle?
Glenn Kent:One of the big issues was the fa-
mous A-7, A-10 fly-off. A representative on the
HouseArmed Services Committeewas a gentle-
man fromTexas. Hewanted theAir Force to buy
the A-7 built in Texas. There’s a big controversy
about it and he got enough power over there to
hold up the go-ahead to start the A-10 until this
is settled. So they decided they were going to
have a fly-off. Starbird was given the job of
conducting and overseeing the fly-off. Starbird
was a three-star Army general. Smart as all get
out, unparalleled in this. He had the ear of
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and rightly
so. Starbird in turn gaveme the job. I waswork-
ing for him on his behalf.
We wrote the terms of reference for the fly-
off between the A-10 and the A-7. I can remem-
ber some of the things we wrote. That the pilots
would all be F-4 pilots from Vietnam. That none
of the pilots would be pilots that had flown A-7
or A-10 before, because they’re wed to it and a
biased witness. That they would go out on these
missions of close air support and write down
immediately afterward a mission report, which
would be bonded. That nobody’s to see it until
later. This is so that no one can say that a high-
ranking general in the Air Force dictated the
answer.
We had some trials along the way. I wrote
these terms of reference for the fly-off in great
detail. Starbird bought it. Sent it to the Air Force
over the signature of Laird whereupon some
generals in the Air Force said, ‘‘These terms of
reference are just guiding principles.’’ And
started to do things their own way. I called Gen
Dixon (Dixon then was head of TAC) and said,
‘‘This isn’t going towork. I ran this by these guys
in the Air Force before I sent it Starbird. They
didn’t have any problemwith it. Now they think
they can ignore it and they’re crazy.’’ Dixon
agreed with me and laid down the law.
They went ahead and painted one of the
A-10s, and then Art wanted to paint the A-7. I
said, ‘‘That’s a foul.’’ They said, ‘‘Well, it doesn’t
do any good.’’ ‘‘Why did you paint the A-10? It
won’t wash. You either have to paint them both
or neither one.’’ Dixon said, ‘‘I’ll look into it.’’
He called me back about 15 minutes later and
said, ‘‘It’s easier to paint than to wash, so we’re
going to paint both of them.’’ We had little
things like that. But that worked out pretty well
because Dixon played it right down the line.
It came time to make a report to the Senate
and theHouse Armed Services Committee. This
representative from Texas was a little late, so
when he arrives, we’re sitting in the ante room
waiting for him. When he arrives, he looks at
Dixon and he said, ‘‘I guess you have this all or-
chestrated. I see you’ve got your six pilots lined
up here.’’ Dixon said, ‘‘I have never seen them
before in my life until today and I wouldn’t
have talked to them today if you had been on
time. I don’t know what they’re going to say. If
anybody in the Air Force knows what they are
going to say, I’ll have them for breakfast. That’s
the edict I put out. They’re not to discuss their
mission reports with anybody.’’
The representative from Texas is somewhat
impressed by this forceful statement by Dixon
and he said, ‘‘Who do you want to go first?’’
Dixon said, ‘‘It’s your call.’’ It turned out, he
called on Maj Dale Tabor (later Maj Gen). I re-
member to this day. He couldn’t have called
on a better guy to be an advocate for the A-10.
So, that worked out pretty well to have the pi-
lots be the testifiers. And Tabor said, ‘‘If I get
sent out on a close air support mission, and if
I had my choice of the A-7 or A-10, I’m going
to call on the A-10.’’
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Bob Sheldon: Maj Tabor had flown both?
Glenn Kent: Oh yes. All the pilots had flown
an equal number of sorties in both airplanes
and then compared them. That got to the whole
argument.
Bob Sheldon:Howmany of them favored the
A-10 versus the A-7?
Glenn Kent: Practically all of them after
Tabor.
Bob Sheldon: Did you bring any of your
Studies and Analysis experience with you to
WSEG?
Glenn Kent: The experience I brought to
WSEG from Studies and Analysis was disci-
pline. At WSEG, I wrote a memo shortly after I
was there, talked about the two slots in the wall;
that the concept here seems to be that there’s
two slots in the wall; one ‘‘out’’ and one ‘‘in.’’
The one out is the little tiny slot; it’s just a di-
rective to do something. The slot in is a report,
and that’s the total interaction of WSEG and
IDA; and this is about to change.
The guys in WSEG and IDA didn’t cater to
that because they said, ‘‘Analysis is analysis
and should not be affected by some general they
send over here. We object to this intrusion.’’
That didn’t last. So we had greater interac-
tion of me critiquing their studies down to the
multiplication. I can remember once somebody
said, ‘‘This is not what generals are about.’’
I said, ‘‘You’re absolutely right. I shouldn’t have
to check your math. But, when I see a string of
figures all less than one and you get an answer
out the other end, larger than one of them,
there’s something wrong.’’ You know they had
made a stupid error.
So, we had greater interaction. They rejected
that at first, but later onwhen I leftWSEG and re-
tired from active duty, they held a party and it’s
like, ‘‘We’re gonna’ miss you.’’
When I was at WSEG, I did one thing and
I had mixed emotions about how smart an idea
it was. I decided I ought to have a campaign
model. I wouldn’t do that today. I got money
from Johnny Foster, $2.5 million to be distrib-
uted among three contractors, and charter them
to develop a campaign model for the Central
Front. In retrospect, that probably wasn’t one
of the greatest ideas I ever had. I let a contract
go to three people, Dr. Seth Bonder of Vector Re-
search, Dr. Jerry Bracken of IDA, and Dr. Norair
Lulejian of Lulejian and Associates. Now that I
think about it, it was more about the mathemat-
ics of firefights or battles than about campaigns.
Traces of their models are around today. They
were the father or the mother or something of
the models today, although the lineage is pretty
obscure. As I recall, the model developed by
Jerry Bracken at IDA became IDAGAM (Insti-
tute for Defense Analyses Ground-Air Model).
Of the three models, the one that was the best
was by Lulejian andAssociates, and it was later—
some version of it was adopted by PA&E.
The reason I say it wasn’t one of my great-
est ideas is because, you see, you have to stitch
together the firefights and the battles to make
a campaign and they didn’t do very well at that.
As amatter of fact, the work at Vector wasmainly
about the mathematics of firefights, a model for
firefights and Seth Bonder prospered with the
Army on that.
But those didn’t work out as I expected. I
expected to expand on Leon Goodson’s Saber
Grand so that the model could be used for allo-
cation of the money among different players.
They got mired down, all of them. The one in
IDA, I cancelled their contract for awhile be-
cause they didn’t adhere tomy idea of the rigors
of math. They were pretty sloppy.
These were called campaign models, but
they were down to the engagement level in the
model. If you have an engagement and you
add a few more Blues—if you’re flying over
their defense—you lose more Blues, but the
fractional loss of Blue goes down. So, the idea
of plugging into a constant attrition rate—either
you’ll lose 5 percent of your force or 3 percent,
or whatever the number is, is wrong.
IDAmade amistake. They had a young guy
over there, alleged to be a mathematician be-
cause he had a doctorate degree, and he decided
to take me on. The outcome of that was I spent
a lot of time putting him back in his box and can-
celled the contract.
Then after I cancelled the contract, they on
their own redid their math and came back
and showed me and I said, ‘‘Okay. Reinstate
the contract.’’ And that was the beginning of
IDAGAM. But as I say, that never worked out
very well.
I have one story about my tenure at WSEG.
There were two items—one Army and one Air
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Force. We were theWeapons System Evaluation
Group, and I took it seriously. One item was an
unguided, free-flight rocket. The Army called it
a missile. It’s going to have some kind of CBUs
in it.
But if it goes 100miles, it’s free-flight, not in-
ertially guided. It can’t hit the side of a barn. The
Army general over at WSEG, I gave him the
project and he declared it useless; we should
not proceed with it.
The other item had to do with the Air Force
and it had a cheap air-to-air missile to replace
Sidewinder and Sparrow. But the only thing
about it, it wasn’t as capable as the air-to-air
missiles we had then. The only thing about it,
allegedly, was that it was cheaper. It’s going to
be made by the same contractors. It’s all paper;
it’s all built on a house of cards. It’s cheaper.
Well, the contractors will say anything at this
stage. So, I declared that null and void.
Dr. Malcolm Currie, the head of DDR&E,
called me over there on each one of these items,
not both items at the same time, but on different
occasions not too far apart. He said this was
hampering his advocacy of this Army missile
in Congress, and it was hampering our intended
sale to Italy. I said, ‘‘Well, cancel it.’’ He didn’t
see the merit of that.
He wanted me to redo the report. I said, ‘‘If
there’s anything wrong with the report, if
there’s a flaw in it, I’ll redo it.’’ He said, ‘‘That’s
not quite what I said.’’ So, I tried to finesse it. But
the thing about the air-to-air missile came up
too. On both of them I finally, in effect said,
‘‘No, I’m not going to redo the report. I’ve gone
back and there’s no reason to do it.’’ Plenty of
people in the Army think it’s a mistake. About
the only people who think it’s a good idea in
the Army is this SPO, this System Project Office.
About that time my other boss, Admiral
Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the JCS called
me in. He liked me. He said, ‘‘Sit down, young
man.’’ After exchanging pleasantries he said,
‘‘How are you getting along with your other
boss?’’ I said, ‘‘Fairly well.’’ ‘‘You don’t have any
problems with him?’’ ‘‘No specific problems.’’
The Admiral looked atme and said, ‘‘Young
man, I have the impression that’s the first time
you’ve lied to me. Let’s get it straight. I know
you’re lying now; I hope it’s the first time. Let’s
repeat it from the top, down. Do you have any
problems with your other boss?’’ I realized I’d
been had, and the Admiral knew it song and
verse about these two programs and some
others. So he said, ‘‘Look, the military has got
to have integrity. And I’m telling you this, if
you bow down and redo those reports, you’ll
have me to answer to.’’ So that made the call
easy.
I paid a little bit for that. The head of
DDR&E was not enthralled with my running
of WSEG. As a matter of fact, what happened
was—I learned this later—he decided to wait
until I was going to retire and make a move.
He said, ‘‘The least worst guy you could handle
is a three-star general that’s going to retire, and
we’re going to do away with WSEG.’’ That was
a cardinal error that the head of DDR&E carried
the day. I maybe should’ve put up more of
a fight, but I didn’t. Moorer had gone, so there
was nobody to carry the ball. But they did away
with WSEG.
When I was over there, it was the WSEG/
IDA team and that worked pretty well. The ci-
vilians in IDA—months after I left—called me
back over there for a party and said, ‘‘We miss
you.’’
Jim Bexfield: You retired from the Air Force
in 1974. So it’s been 30 years at RAND?
Glenn Kent: No, I didn’t go to RAND right
away. I’ve been at RAND about 25 years. Before
RAND, I was a consultant in Northrop and
Boeing and mainly on the B-2. I got right in on
the B-2, some guy atNorthropwhowas promot-
ing the whole thing—this stealth aircraft, he
was one shrewd apple. He got me right in with
both companies, so he could have an influence
on how they went. I got tired of that and went
to work for RAND after a few years.
I wish somebody would commission a
study today of stealth. I have a stealth bomber—
let’s say at 40,000 feet—and the enemy has
SA-10s or SA-20s. I don’t remember the details.
I made the calculation years ago, when I first
came to RAND, that with a high powered jam-
mer that Raytheon can build they couldn’t track
me 100 miles away. But you see it comes out to-
day because if we’re going to loiter up there for
close air support. We have no problem in Iraq,
but just someplace somebody’s going to have
an SA-10 or 20 or derivative or something like
that.
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Bob Sheldon: What projects did you pick up
at RAND?
Glenn Kent: I spent a good deal of time talk-
ing about first strike stability. I spent more time
on that than the subject warranted.
I did that in response to the efforts that were
kicked off by Reagan’s famous speech about
Star Wars, to make nuclear weapons obsolete. I
pointed out, and rightly so—but too few people
wanted to listen to it—that if you build a defense
that can handle a ragged, retaliatory attack of
the enemy, it’s unstable. He knows it and it’s
a self-feeding instability. He knows that I know
it. I know that he knows it, so that you put in
a partial defense like that, it invites each country
to preempt, in order to avoid a worse solution.
I purposely, for social reasons, never let the
cost of war be below zero. The cost was always
zero or above. It was zero if I preempted and
destroyed all their missiles, so that I got no dam-
age in return, which is only a hypothetical case
but even then the cost was zero
I spent a lot of time on that, David Thaler
and I did. There were some people interested
in it, the Jason Group. The calculations were
mind-boggling and the Jason Group said they
were impressed by it, but would I mind if they
hired some mathematician to check it out?
They did and they declared it was without er-
ror, amazingly enough.
Bob Sheldon:Do you knowwhat mathemati-
cian checked it out?
Glenn Kent:No, I don’t. It was two guys that
worked in some outfit of Lockheed on the West
Coast.
I spent a good deal of the time on that. I had
one winner in that area—working on a new ap-
proach to arms control. It’s a long story. It was
bought by the ‘‘Gang of 6’’ in Congress, consist-
ing of Senator Cohen, Senator Nunn, Senator
Percy, Representative Dicks, Senator Gore, and
Representative Aspin.
They latched onto it and through hook or
crook and many twists and turns, then sold it
to the Scowcroft Commission on Strategic Forces,
who in turn sold it to President Reagan, and the
new approach to arms control, which is quite dif-
ferent. It’s written out in great detail in a book by
Strobe Talbott, Endgame: The Inside Story of Salt II.
Jim Bexfield: What was the concept behind
that?
Glenn Kent: What I objected to was arms
control that just stops missiles and ignores the
size of the missiles. Like a missile is a missile.
Arms control also inhibits survivability while
letting the destructive potential grow and mak-
ing a preemptive strike better for both sides.
My idea is very simple, the concept. Start
with national technical means. I can measure
the volume of missiles. So I’m just left to de-
ploy so much volume. I made a distinction
whether it’s wet or dry—you get more thrust
per volume if it’s dry. Rather than do it on vol-
ume, I just said I’ll relate it to standard weapon
stations. With amissile of this volume, I’ll charge
it to so many standard weapons stations.
I called them stations, see? I didn’t call them
weapons. The big thing then was the SSAT—the
large, Soviet missile. So I’ll charge 18 standard
weapons stages. The MX, I’ll charge you 10, just
to give you some ideas. The Minuteman 3, I’ll
charge you 3. If it’s a really small, single Army
missile I’ll call you 1.
With forward bombers, very ingeniously,
I’ll look at the platform of your bomber, which
I can look at and test with technical means with
satellites, and I just have a formula that says if
the projected area of your bomber is so-and-so,
I’ll charge it so many stations.
It’s still the right way to go. Then the guy is
free to do anything hewants within the restraint
of total volume. And I got nothing but grief
about that from Ambassador Rowny from the
ACDA. [Lt Gen (retired) Edward L. Rowny
was the chief negotiator for SALT.] Of course,
needless to say, they’re a little edgy. They’re a lit-
tle bit of ‘‘not invented here.’’ Here’s the ACDA
and here comes a guy from outside the agency
with a new radical approach to arms control.
They formed an interagency group. The
charter of the interagency group was that my
approach had five fatal flaws to it—they had
to fill in the blanks. They never did fill in the
blanks. They finally settled on the idea that it’s
too complex. But it’s not complex at all.
Bob Sheldon: Did the ‘‘Gang of 6’’ like it?
Glenn Kent: Oh yes. They were the ones that
made it go. Nunn and Aspin, they latched onto
it and I didn’t realize exactly what was going on
for a while. For a while I was going out to James
Woolsey’s house at night and Brent Scowcroft
was there and Walt Slocombe, and Aspin was
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there. And they’d go over it and tidy it up some-
what and I’d go back and work all next day, and
meeting the next night and so on. They’re tidy-
ing it up so that they can push it themselves and
I gradually came to realize that there was a rea-
son Aspin was there. To shape it so that they
could buy it and push it. He had some ideas of
his own, which were good. Ambassador Rowny
protested against it until the bitter end. Those
guys maneuvered the whole thing. Got the
Scowcroft Commission to buy into it. That’s
why Woolsey and Scowcroft were there, be-
cause Nunn and Percy had it in mind to run it
by them.
Came the showdown and President Reagan
is going to announce in the Rose Garden which
one he selects. Woolsey is standing right next to
Rowny, and Rowny says, ‘‘The President’s go-
ing to say he rejects this idea.’’ And he didn’t;
he bought it because Reagan’s National Security
Advisor William ‘‘The Judge’’ Clark got to him
about an hour before the ceremony in the Rose
Garden and said, "What are you doing? You’re
getting all sorts of flak about your approach to
arms control and here the guys you need in
the Congress are united, bipartisan for this
new approach. So is this Scowcroft Commission
which you said you take great stock in.What are
you doing? I’m not here debating the merit of
the thing on a technical basis. I’m here asking,
‘‘What are we doing?’’ So, Reagan reversed
and bought it.
And it never went anywhere because about
that time, they’re going to have another meeting
with the Soviets over there, but the Soviets had
decided ahead of time they’re going to just as-
semble in Switzerland and then walk out. They
sent Woolsey over there with Rowny to describe
this.
Bob Sheldon: Since you were doing all these
strategic studies at RAND, how did your analy-
sis focus change when the Soviet Union fell
apart?
Glenn Kent: It had already started gravitat-
ing from strategic nuclear to conventional forces
on the Central Front. I didn’t convert right away
because Star Wars kept me in this ‘‘first strike’’
to go for a while longer than it should have.
Bob Sheldon: I’d like to ask about a publi-
cation of yours called ‘‘Simple Mathematical
Models of Combat.’’
Glenn Kent: I think that was a report that
I did at RAND, ‘‘Simple Analytic Solutions to
Complex Military Problems.’’
Bob Sheldon: What brought about that publi-
cation?
Glenn Kent: I’d tell the analyses that had
been done and somebody encouraged me to
write them down. So, I did. It’s not as good
a document as it might be. I did it with a young
lad who was hired for the summer at RAND,
Michael Finn. It had a formula for a number of
successful sorties, which is just a matter of inte-
grating. You have a certain attrition rate and
how many successful sorties do you have for
100 aircraft after a certain number of cycles?
That was one formula in there.
Bob Sheldon: One of your papers ‘‘On Analy-
sis’’ was republished in the PHALANX recently.
One of your thrusts is that analysts don’t make
recommendations. Comment on that.
Glenn Kent: I said when you’re conducting
analysis—the analysis is not to have a recom-
mendation. You can have concluding remarks.
I don’t even want a summary or something like
that because you feel an insane compulsion to
let the world know what you think should be
done. That’s up to the Chief to decide, and if
he separatelywants your recommendation young
man, he’ll ask you.
I gave that speech to a group of analysts at
MORS, I think it was, to stunned silence and
downright hostility. I had literally taken the
birthright away from the analysts. But later on,
they had a change of heart. If you make recom-
mendations something should be done, the guy
reads that and he looks at that and if he agrees
with it, he doesn’t read the report. If he dis-
agrees with it, he throws it away. The report is
graded on whether it recommends what you
think.
Analysis is to provide insight, not recom-
mendations, so I adhered strictly to that rule
when I had done an analysis.
Bob Sheldon:How do you feel about the evo-
lution of the analytic community since the 1990s
into the 2000s?
Glenn Kent: I’m afraid to say. The analysis
seems to become less transparent with the ad-
vent of computers and PowerPoint. And the
language has grown. There seems to be a certain
lack of discipline nowadays. We pick up buzz
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words and run with them and think we’ve just
discovered sex and sliced bread because we’ve
got some buzz word—network-centric warfare
and C4ISR are some ofmy pet peeves. So, I don’t
know that it’s progressed all it should.
Bob Sheldon: What would be your recom-
mendations to the analytic community?
Glenn Kent: There’s got to be somebodywho
can enforce the discipline, but that’s a hard
thing to do. You’ve got to have the power to
do it, and the dedication to it. But, I can’t preach
on that because when I first started in analy-
sis, people would try to push me in the direc-
tion of saying ‘‘that analysis doesn’t measure
up and so on, to meet some standard.’’ I said,
‘‘No, I’ve got enough to do without doing
that.’’
If there’s a report out there with analysis
that’s wrong and in an important way on an
important subject, I’ll take it on case-by-case.
That’s what I am here to do. But I made no effort
on my part when I was head of Studies and
Analysis to enforce that all across the Air Force.
You’d be swallowed by that, so I can’t preach
too strongly that somebody should do it today.
But to repeat, if I took on a case it was be-
cause it was wrong, wrong and on an important
subject and had a bearing on an important sub-
ject. And then I took it on lock, stock and barrel
and they changed, believe me.
Bob Sheldon: Explain what you mean by
discipline.
Glenn Kent: Sit down and think about what
it is you’re trying to do in the analysis, what in-
sight you want to provide, and sketch out in
your mind the graphs you want to plot and so
on, and then do it rigorously, and have peer re-
view. And I mean peer critique, not just cursory
review, it’s got to stand peer review. I would
have murder sessions in my office that went
on for an hour or more on analysis. Somebody
would brief it, and others critiqued it. But I
mean they were murder sessions. That helps,
and of course, discipline.
Jim Bexfield: Of all the jobs that you had
throughout your career, which one did you like
the most?
Glenn Kent: Studies and Analysis.
Jim Bexfield: That’s what I thought. That’s
the highlight of many careers.
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